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I. INTRODUCTION
The Clinton Administration has achieved significant arms
control milestones in the last two years. Major nuclear weapons
related treaties have been signed, including the indefinite extension
of the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT),'
accompanied by a reaffirmation of the U.S. negative security
assurance (NSA),2 the U.S. announcement that it would unilaterally
discontinue virtually all nuclear weapons testing activities in support
of a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 11
August 1995;' the U.S. signature of the CTBT on 24 September 1996;-
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He is currently assigned as the legal and ocean policy advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (N3IN5). The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author alone and are not to be construed as the position of the Department of
Defense, Navy, or the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. See Final Document on Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, May 11, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 959. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons originally entered into force for the United States on 5 March 1970. See generally
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. Before the indefinite extension, the original
treaty was to last for a period of twenty-five years. See id. art. X(2).
2. The U.S. negative security assurance (in which the United States pledges not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states which adhere to the NPT
norms) [hereinafter NSA] is discussed in detail throughout this article. See infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
3. See White House Press Briefing by Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy
Robert Bell, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
The 11 August 1995 announcement contained two basic caveats: (a) the United States would
retain the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the
United States cease to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the United States would withdraw from
the CrBT under the "supreme national interest right" if the President was informed by the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command that a high
level of confidence in the safety or reliability of the U.S. strategic stockpile could no longer be
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and the joint statement by President Clinton and Russian President
Boris Yeltsin on 22 March 1997, establishing a framework for
START Ill. 5 Other significant nuclear related initiatives have
included the U.S. signature (along with France and the UK) of the
Treaty of Raratonga, establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone (SPNFZ) on 25 March 1996, the U.S. signature of the Treaty of
Pelindaba, establishing the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(ANWFZ) on 11 April 1996, and the U.S. support for ASEAN's
negotiation and conclusion of the Bangkok Treaty that established
the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ).8
In addition to the nuclear agenda, the Administration undertook
robust efforts to control the development and proliferation of other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Consistent with President
Nixon's 1969 renunciation of first use of chemical weapons or any use
of biological weapons,9 in 1996 the United States expanded its
domestic implementation of the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention" (BWC) to punish crimes associated with possession of
biological weapons components. The Clinton Administration is now
pursuing Senate advice and consent on the Chemical Weapons
verified. See id. The United Kingdom made its own announcement on 14 September 1995 to
support a zero-yield CrBT. See Britain Backs Absolute Ban on Test Explosions, Reuters North
American Wire, Sept.14,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
4. See generally Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1439 [hereinafter CTBT]. All five of the nuclear weapons states have signed the CTBT.
The treaty will enter into force when all 44 countries with nuclear reactors have signed it. India
and Pakistan refused to sign. See Clinton Signs Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
LEXIS/NEXIS HOTTOPICs, Oct. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Hot Topics Library, Hotlaw File.
One hundred and forty-six nations have signed the treaty. See Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (visited Sept. 26,1997) <http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ctbtsigs.htm>.
5. See Press Conference by President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Federal
News Service, Mar. 22,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
6. See South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177
[hereinafter SPNFZ].
7. See African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Jun. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 698
[hereinafter ANWFZ]. The Treaty of Pelindaba has been signed by all 53 eligible African
Nations. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (visited Sept. 26, 1997)
<http'J/www.acda.gov/treaties/afnwsigs.htm>.
. See Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec.15, 1995,35 I.L.M.
635 [hereinafter SEANWFZ].
9. See UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 130 (1990) [hereinafter ACDA Agreements].
10. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacterial (Biological) Weapons and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for
signature Mar. 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. This convention entered into force
on the same date as the U.S. ratification. The domestic implementation is found at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 175-78 (1994) [hereinafter BWC].
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Convention (CWC). n The CWC attacks the problem of chemical
weapons proliferation in a worldwide commercial context and
contains detailed provisions on verification, including an intrusive
inspection regime, protection of confidential information, and
development of collective measures to assure continued operations of
legitimate chemical industries.'
On the conventional front, in May of 1996, the United States
signed a revision to Protocol II of the Convention 'on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW)1  The CCW includes new
restrictions on the use and transfer of landmines, as well as
requirements that landmines be detectable and self-destruct or self-
deactivate. Concomitant with the CCW changes, on 16 May 1996
(two weeks after the Protocol II changes were finalized), the Clinton
Administration took the CCW commitments a step further by
announcing a new U.S. landmine policy. 4 That policy was liberalized
further in a White House statement on 17 September 1997 specifying
that the United States would observe a permanent ban on landmine
exports, increase funding for landmine alternatives, and commit
substantial funding to de-mining efforts in 1998.15
11. See The White House, M2 Presswire, Sept. 24,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File.
12. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter
CWC]. The Convention has been signed by 165 countries, 100 of which have ratified the treaty.
The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(visited Sept. 16,1997) <http:llwww.acda.gov/factshee/wmdlew/Cwcsig.htm>.
13. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1524 [hereinafter CCW]. This convention contains extensive
new restrictions on the use and delivery of landmines. It essentially requires that all landmines
be self-disarming and prohibits most forms of booby-traps. See id. at arts. 5(1)(b), 6. Protocol
II revisions were adopted in early May 1996. See Protocol on the Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206. For an
analysis of the new protocol revisions, see Michael Matheson, New Landmine Protocol is Vital
Step to Ban, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July 1996, at 9-17 [hereinafter Matheson]; Stephen
Goose, CCW States Fail to Stem Crisis; U.S. Policy Now an Obstacle, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
July 1996, at 9-17.
14. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 16. The four-point policy requires the U.S. Executive
Branch to: (1) diplomatically pursue an international ban on anti-personnel land mines; (2)
enforce an immediate ban despite a nine year grace period in the CCW amendments on use of
"dumb" mines except on the Korean Peninsula and for training purposes; (3) reserve the right
to use "smart" mines until an international ban takes effect; and (4) maintain an omnibus
reservation of the right of use of anti-personnel mines in Korea in future negotiations so long as
tensions remain high and no alternatives exist. See id.
15. See Transcript of Clinton Remarks on Landmine Elimination, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 17,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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A fair question that the arms control community needs to ask is
whether, in the aggregate, the current United States policy of
providing arms control "leadership" in a variety of fora is actually
destabilizing. The underlying premise of this Article is that arms
control initiatives that are justifiable, comprehensive, and well-timed
are worthwhile and in the national interest. However, given the
explosion of arms control initiatives in a short period of time, it is
appropriate to take a calm and reflective look at whether the pace
should be slowed.
This Article's underlying assumptions are that the U.S.
Government is irrevocably committed to: (a) gaining universal
control over the NPT framework; (b) pursuing CTBT in order to
stifle the development of new nuclear programs; (c) pursuing the
world-wide accession of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
and (d) advocating full and effective implementation of the BWC to
complete the WMD circle. This leaves unanswered the questions of
nuclear weapons free zone treaties pending Senate advice and
consent (ANWFZ and SPNFZ), action concerning completed treaties
that the United States has not yet signed (SEANWFZ), and U.S.
support for free zone initiatives in their formative stages.
Accordingly, this Article will address the core question of whether
the U.S. Government should support new and pending nuclear
weapons free zones given the current pace of the initiatives, their
potentially destabilizing effect, and the fact that pursuit of regional
efforts may detract from comprehensive global arms control
(including the zero yield CTBT, CWC, and enhanced controls in the
biological warfare area), which are a high national priority.
II. BACKGROUND
US Policy On NW Free Zones Article VII of the NPT
expressly recognizes nuclear
States in region must oiginate the concept weapons free zone treaties as•Ali Important states must p rticipate
Mst have adequate verficaon regional gap-fillers."6
SExstng secerity arngements mustbe respected
Must prohibit development of nuclear explosive Provided they meet certain
devicesSMustassure freedom of navigation end overflight criteria (Fig. 1) they are
•must permnit sea and airport visits ciei F g ) t e r
uI supported as a matter of U.S.
policy.17  An underlying
16. See NPT, supra note 1, at art. VII. Article VII reads, "Nothing in this treaty affects the
right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories." Id.
17. See ACDA Agreements, supra note 9, at 64.
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premise for nuclear free zones is that these treaties are useful to
establish norms regionally which have not been established globally,
such as prohibitions on the testing or stationing of nuclear weapons
inside a region. Nuclear weapons free zones also have been used in
the past to establish a system of nuclear inspection safeguards that
reach a greater number of activities than the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards found in the NPT.18 For example,
The Treaty of Tlatelocoestablished safeguards for Brazil's nuclear
programs during the many years that Brazil remained outside the
NPT. Of course,
these existing Obligations of Treaty Parties
initiatives exact a
legally binding
negative security
assurance from * Parties may not acquire nuclear weapons or assist
the nuclear any nation to obtain them
e Parties must apply and submit to IAEA safeguards &
weapons states export control restrictions
(P-5), and place * Parties may not permit stationing of nuclear
restraints on weapons on their territory
stationing or * Parties may not permit testing of nuclear weapons on
testing nuclear their territory
* Parties may not dump radioactive waste or
weapons inside radioactive matter at sea within the zone;
the zone of Figure 2
application.'
Given the restraints on its nuclear activities, U.S. support for zone
proposals is a case-by-case affair. Specific political factors or world
events had a significant influence on the timing of the U.S. decisions
to sign the two most recent zone treaties.
21
Although all zones are not created equal, common terms which
18. See NPT, supra note 1.
19. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
634 U.N.T.S. 362 [hereinafter Tlateloco].
20. See NSA, supra note 2.
21. The timing of the U.S. announcement to sign the Treaty of Raratonga and its signature
was heavily influenced by French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific in the fall and
winter of 1996 and, indeed, may have had a significant impact in the decision of France to abate
some of its planned tests. See US, France, Britain to Join S. Pacific N-Pact, Reuters North
American Wire, Oct. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. The timing of
the U.S. signature of the Treaty of Pelindaba also was driven by a U.S. desire to support
President Mandela of South Africa, who was an active proponent of the treaty. See generally
The White House, Federal News Service, Apr. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
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the regional treaty parties undertake are depicted in Figure 2.2 The
terms reflected in points one and two are taken directly from the
NPT and, like the other factors, are essential to favorable U.S.
consideration of any NWFZ proposal. To be acceptable to the
United States, the treaty obligations also must be met in a framework
that does not upset other important international rights or
obligations.'5 Also, the treaty zone must be carefully bounded
geographically so that it does not interfere with the operation of ships
and aircraft, the exercise
of high seas freedoms, Obligations of P-5
and various transit
rights in and over the mniiu..uili
marine environment.' Nuclear Weapons States (Protocol Parties) commit-
It must also be . not to test nuclear weapons Inside the zone;
" neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons
sufficiently flexible to against any treaty or protocol party Inside the
permit the visits of territory/territodal sea of a party
" neither station, develop, or manufacture nuclear
nuclear powered and weapons Inside any of their possessions (as
nuclear weapons- applicable) inside the zone.
capable ships and Figure 3
aircraft to seaports and
airports.'
To date, all nuclear weapons free zone treaties contain one or
more protocols that the nuclear weapons states (P-5) are eligible to
sign. These protocols provide a legally binding negative security
assurance (NSA) that the P-5 will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against treaty parties or other protocol parties inside the
zone.5 Additionally, protocol signatories undertake a host of other
commitments.' Unless a protocol party gives notice of its intent to
22. Figure 2, Bullet 1-see SEANWFZ at art. 3; ANWFZ at art. 3; Tlateloco at art. 1.2;
SPNFZ at art. 3. Bullet 2-see SEANWFZ at arts. 4, 5; ANWFZ at arts. 8 and 9; Tlateloco at
arts. 13, 14; SPNFZ at art. 4 and annex 2. Bullet 3-see SEANWFZ at art. 3(2); ANWFZ at art.
4; Tlateloco at art. 1(1)(b); SPNFZ at art. 5. Bullet 4-see SEANWFZ at art. 3; ANWFZ at art.
5; Tlateloco at art. 1; SPNFZ at art. 6. Bullet 5-see SEANWFZ at art. 3(3); ANWFZ at art. 7;
SPNFZ at art. 7.
23. See ACDA Agreements, supra note 9, at 64.
24. See Nuclear Issues in the South Pacific: Hearing Before the Asian and Pacific
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on International Relations, Federal News Service, Nov. 15,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
25. See id.
26. See NSA, supra note 2.
27. See Figure 3, Bullet 1-see SEANWFZ at Protocol I art. 1; ANWFZ at Protocol II art.
1; Tlateloco at Protocol II art. 2; SPNFZ at Protocol III art. 1. Bullet 2-see SEANWFZ at
Protocol I art.2; ANWFZ at Protocol I art. 1; Tlateloco at Protocol II art. 3; SPNFZ at Protocol
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withdraw from one or more of the protocols and waits the required
periodf because its supreme national interests are threatened, the
legally binding NSA and other promises are of indefinite duration.
Protocol parties also are bound by language in all of the treaties not
to "contribute to any act which would constitute a violation of the
treaty by a treaty party." 9 This language serves to deter the use of
proxy states, or indirect means, to subvert the basic object and
purpose of the treaty.
The Antarctic Treaty of 19590 is the historical antecedent for
regional zones and later efforts in the 1960's and 1970's to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons to the global commons: the seabed and
outer space. In 1960, the United States became a party to the
Antarctic Treaty which prohibits, inter alia, any military activities in
Antarctica. Such military activities include establishing bases,
carrying out maneuvers,3 or conducting activities that result in a
nuclear explosion or creation of nuclear waste.32
The non-proliferation aspects of the Antarctic Treaty enjoyed
popularity and spurred the conclusion of the "global" efforts,
including the Treaty on Principles Concerning Exploration of Outer
Space of 1967,' 3 and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971.3 The
Outer Space Convention prevents orbiting nuclear weapons and the
installation of any weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on the
moon, or on other celestial bodies. Similarly, Article 1 of the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty prohibits state parties from "implanting or
emplacing" any nuclear weapons or "other weapons of mass
destruction as well as structures, launching installations, or other
facilities" on the "seabed and the ocean floor."3s For purposes of the
Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the non-nuclear zone extends seaward
II art. 1. Bullet 3-see SEANWFZ Protocol I art.1; ANWFZ at Protocol II art. 2; Tlateloco at
Protocol II art.2.
28. The waiting periods range from three months for Tlateloco (Latin America) and
Raratonga (SPNFZ) to twelve months for both ANWFZ and SEANXVFZ.
29. SPNFZ, supra note 6, at art. 1 (Protocol II).
30. See Antarctic Treaty, Jun. 23,1961,12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
31. Seeid. atart. I.
32. See id. at art. V.
33. See The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410,610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
34. See The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
May 18,1972,23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, art. 1(1) [hereinafter Seabed Treaty].
35. Id.
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from the twelve nautical miles territorial sea of all of its parties.?6
Both the Outer Space Treaty and the 1982 U.N. Convention on Law
of the Sea Treaty contain aspirational language limiting the use of the
seas and outer space for "peaceful purposes. '
A succession of regional efforts at nuclear non-proliferation
have been attempted in most geographic regions. In 1957, Adam
Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, presented a plan for an "atom
free zone" for Central Europe before the UN General Assembly.'
Resurrected twice in 1973 and 1982 in NATO disarmament and
CSCE talks, respectively, the plan called for establishing a corridor
free of nuclear weapons along a 150 km wide area on either side of
the border separating the former German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia from the former West Germany. 9 Also proposed but
not established in the late 1950's, were the Nordic Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone, which encompassed Norway, Finland, Sweden, and
Denmark,4 and the Balkan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for all
Balkan Countries (including Turkey and Greece) and the Adriatic."
Neither the Nordic proposal nor the Balkan Zone seriously took root
since they were promoted by the Soviet Union, and were viewed by
the United States as an attempt to fracture NATO and disrupt
NATO nuclear deterrent policies.42
In addition to abortive regional zone proposals, there have been
attempts at establishing zones of peace intended as "off-limits," or
"buffer" areas, where superpower competition is not allowed. The
classic example is ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN), recited as the authoritative basis for the recently
adopted SEANWFZ treaty which sought establishment of a large
high seas buffer between Southeast Asia and Pakistan on one side
and India on the other which encompassed areas of the Indian
Ocean.43 Because work on SEANWFZ is complete, the ZOPFAN
36. See id. art. II. It is ironic that the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty recognized a
12NM territorial sea limit well before its ultimate acceptance (with considerable controversy at
the time) in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
37. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 33; Seabed Treaty, supra note 34.
38. See PAULE. ZINNER, NUCLEAR FREE ZONES 26 (1988).
39. See id. at 27.
40. See id. at 30.
41. See id. at 31.
42. See id. at 32-43.
43. India has already exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device. India therefore considers
itself to be a non-nuclear weapons state. Both India and Pakistan are described as "one
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concept may be in remission. However, so long as India and Pakistan
remain undeclared nuclear powers outside of the NPT, one can
expect initiatives to resurrect ZOPFAN to rid the Indian Ocean of
actual or potential nuclear rivalries.' For years, South Africa and
Brazil have introduced non-binding resolutions for adoption by the
UN General Assembly to create a South Atlantic Zone of Peace, a
proposal that the United States has consistently opposed.4  Most
recently, Brazil and New Zealand persuaded the UN First
Committee to endorse a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone
that appeared to link the Latin American, South Pacific, Antarctic,
and Southeast Asian Zones. 6 This later proposal goes far beyond
existing terrestrial-based zone proposals and seeks to fill the nuclear
free lacunae in the Southern Hemisphere with particular focus on the
high seas.'
Although the United States never endorsed most early regional
nuclear-free zone proposals, the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco established
a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone that the United States signed in
two increments: Protocol IH4 in 1968, and Protocol 49 in 1977. United
screwdriver's turn" away from possession of an operable weapon. Editorial, India's Nuclear
Semantics, WASH. POST, Jun. 2, 1992, at A18.
44. See Pakistan for Zone of Peace in Indian Ocean, Says President Ishaq Khan, Xinhua
General Overseas News Service, May 22,1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File;
see also China Supports Making Indian Ocean Peace Zone, Xinhua News Agency, July 11,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
45. See G.A. Res. 49/84, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 85, U.N.
Doc. A/49/84 (1994).
46. See G.A. Res. 51/45, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 79, U.N.
Doc. A/51/45 (1996).
47. See Letter from Jan Prawitz, Senior Researcher, National Defense Research
Establishment, Stockholm, Sweden to Author (Jan. 13, 1997) (on file with the Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law); DEP'T ST. CABLE, No. 79730 (Nov. 13, 1996) (on file with
author).
48. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, Apr. 1,1968, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 762. The United States signed Protocol II,
which prohibits the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against a Treaty Party, in 1968.
A lengthy ratification process followed in which, inter alia, the United States made
supplemental understandings regarding the Treaty's zone of application and the nature of the
security assurance. More specifically, the United States regarded a Treaty Party's attack on the
United States assisted by one of the P-5 as inconsistent with basic Treaty obligations. The
United States deposited its instruments of ratification in 1971. See ACDA Agreements, supra
note 9, at 81.
49. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, May 26, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 1792, 634 U.N.T.S. 362. Protocol I requires states with
possessions in the zone neither to possess, test, manufacture, produce, nor to station nuclear
weapons in the zone. Because the United States had various territories in the zone (Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone), it was eligible to sign Protocol I in 1977. The United States
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States interests in the Latin American Zone are considerable, given
that U.S. military bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Panama, and
Puerto Rico are located inside the zone. Beyond U.S. endorsement,
Tlateloco is viewed as a success story for playing an understated, yet
moderating role in keeping South and Central America free of
nuclear weapons.' For example, Argentina and Brazil nominally
signed the Treaty of Tlateloco in 1967, but did not ratify it until
nearly thirty years later.51 Nonetheless, Tlateloco provided moral and
political suasion because both Argentina and Brazil had been
threshold nuclear weapons states that had remained outside of the
NPT until both countries concluded their quadripartite agreement
witf the IAEA on 13 December 1991, and abandoned their nuclear
weapons development programs. 2
HI. OLD AND EMERGING ZONES: NEW CHALLENGES
A. Central and Eastern Europe Nuclear Free Zone
The emerging zone proposal most likely to demand immediate
attention is a proposal to create a nuclear free zone from the Black
Sea to the Baltic Sea. In the 1995 NPT review conference, Belarus
(more recently joined by Ukraine) promulgated the concept of a
nuclear free zone to prevent nuclear proliferation in Central and
Eastern Europe. In particular, this nuclear free zone would allay
deposited its instruments of ratification in 1981. See ACDA Agreements, supra note 9, at 81.
50. See Zachary S. Davis, The Spread of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Building a New
Nuclear Bargain, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Feb. 1996, at 19.
51. See ACDA Agreements, supra note 9, at 87. Brazil commenced ratification
procedures in 1967 but did not complete ratification formalities until 30 May 1994. See id.
Argentina completed a "safeguards" agreement in March of 1996. The U.S. and Argentina:
Forging a Strong Global Partnership, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
52. Both Brazil and Argentina's nuclear programs were quite advanced. Brazil not only
had large indigenous deposits of uranium; it also had a substantial civil nuclear research
program. Following the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973, Brazil aggressively obtained enrichment
technology from West Germany that did not require IAEA safeguards to set the stage for a
military sponsored secret program, code-named "Solimones," to develop weapons grade
plutonium. The secret Brazilian plan was exposed in 1990 by then President Collor de Mello.
Argentina's program was dominated by its Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA), which
sought development of a robust and independent civil nuclear power program. Though
advanced, there was limited military participation in the Argentine program. See generally
Scott D. Tollefson, Nuclear Restraint Argentina and Brazil (1-2 Nov. 1996) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law); Michael A. Morris, National and
Multinational Approaches to Naval Security in Latin America (1-2 Nov. 1996) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
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fears that NATO enlargement would create new nuclear weapons
basing options near the Russian heartland that would threaten the
former Soviet Union and her Republics. 3 The Belarus proposal is
patterned after the German reunification agreement known as the
"final settlement."' Under this settlement, the United States, Russia,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom agreed that German
Forces could be stationed in the former East Germany, but that
"foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers" could
not.55 In the context of NATO enlargement, the Belarus proposal
would allow Poland, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary to join
the NATO military apparatus. However, these new NATO members
would either be legally precluded from permitting the stationing of
nuclear weapons on their territory by an external nuclear free zone
treaty, or they would be required to issue Norwegian type
declarations that they would not accept the stationing of nuclear
weapons in their territories in "peace time."5
4CUM NA~l~ TOcn
ON" 1
" i TUNNEY
Figure 4s
53. See generally Jan Prawitz, NWFZC&EE: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central and
Eastern Europe from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, Mar. 26, 1996 (on file with the Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law) [hereinafter NWFZC&EE].
54. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M.
1186; see generally Anatoli A. Rozanov, Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central and
Eastern Europe, THE MONrrOR, Fall 1996, at 19.
55. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, supra note 54, at 1191.
56. See NWFZC&EE, supra note 53, at 8.
57. See For NATO, Eastward Ho!, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1,1997, at 49.
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Although the Belarus proposal has not been presented in much
detail, some Russian officials have embraced the concept 8 as a way of
compensating for the prospect of NATO, approaching their borders
with new members who could, by virtue of Article V of the North
Atlantic Treaty, become a base for nuclear weapons in wartime.'
Even though NATO has no current plans to station nuclear weapons
in former Warsaw Pact areas, and the President has reaffirmed this
policy in the recent Helsinki talks,61 in the past Russian arms control
analysts have not been reassured by "current plans" language
because plans can change.62
The territory of the Zone comprises a large crescent including
the Baltic States: Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The zone then
moves South East to the Black Sea, encompassing Poland, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, the territory of the former East Germany,
Romania and Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary, and the three newly
independent states of Belarus, Ukraine (now non-nuclear), and
Moldova. No text has been proffered, but it is assumed that the
treaty parties would provide reciprocal assurances to other treaty
parties to neither possess, develop, test, nor permit the stationing of
nuclear weapons on their territory. Nuclear weapons states would in
turn be asked to respect the zone by agreeing not to test nuclear
weapons within it, and to provide a legally binding negative security
assurance to neither use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons
against any treaty party. Given the contentious NATO enlargement
background, Russia would undoubtedly insist that the nuclear
58. See Vladimir A. Orlov, Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit: Summing up the
Results, YADERNY KoNTROL DIGEST, Summer 1996, at 7. Sergei Medvedev, Press Secretary
to President Yeltsin, remarked that Russia's official policy is to support the creation of nuclear
weapons free zones where they do not exist. He stated that "in Eastern Europe, including the
outlying districts, a de facto nuclear-weapon-free zone.., not legally finalized... would be a
missed chance." Id.
59. The North Atlantic Parties agree "that an armed attack against one of more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked.., individually and in concert with the other Parties .... North Atlantic Treaty,
Apr. 4,1949, art. 5,63 Stat. 2241,2244,34 U.N.T.S. 243,246.
60. See Vladimir A. Orlov, Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central and Eastern Europe
Proposals and Their Future, Nov. 2, 1996, at 10 (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative
& International Law) [hereinafter Orlov]. See also Figure 4.
61. See For NATO, Eastward Ho!, supra note 57, at 49; Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on
European Security, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curaws
File.
62- See Orlov, supra note 60, at 3.
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weapons states agree not to "station" nuclear weapons or "delivery
systems"6'3 anywhere inside the zone. Similar statements also have
been made by Ukraine (which supports NATO enlargement) to the
effect that "Ukraine will never agree on the possibility of deployment
of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO states... [and the
creation of NWFZ's in Central and Eastern Europe
would] ... increase trust and stability" in the region6"
B. Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone
Over the last 25 years, a variety of states in the Middle East have
sought to establish a nuclear free zone. Supported by Egypt, Iran
raised the issue in the U.N. General Assembly.6 In 1980, Israel
introduced a similar resolution in the U.N. General Assembly that
called for the establishment of a Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDZ)-a goal supported by President
Mubarak in his 1990 proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone.6
More recently, the concept of a WMD Zone was expressly
recognized in the 1995 NPT Review Conference. 7
Egypt, a major player in any Middle East Zone, hosted the
signing ceremony, and signed the Treaty of Pelindaba.' This raises
questions about how a MEWMDZ would co-exist with ANWFZ
because Israel would undoubtedly insist that past, current, or former
"front-line" states such as Libya, Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia each
agree to sign the MEWMDZ before Israel surrendered any of its
WMD capabilities. Putting that issue aside, given the asymmetrical
WMD threats in the region (e.g., Israel's nuclear capability and the
chemical or biological capabilities of many other states), a WMD
zone makes better sense in the Middle East than does a Nuclear
63. Id. at 8. The term "delivery systems" is derived from the "Final Settlement"
agreement and is intended to cover missile and other systems. It is not found in other nuclear
free zone treaties.
64. See Orlov, supra note 60.
65. See G.A. Res. 3263, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 27, U.N.
Doe. A/9631 (1974).
66. See U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, A ZONE FREE OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST at 59, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/96/24, U.N. Sales No.
GV.E.96.0.19 (1996) [hereinafter UNIDIR/96/24].
67. In addition, former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a call at the
NPT Extension Conference for the Middle East States to establish a weapons of mass
destruction free zone by the year 2000. Secretary General Tells NPT Conference that
'Universality is Near. Warns of 'Terrible Risk' in Changing World, Federal News Service, Apr.
18,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
68. See ANWFZ, supra note 7.
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Weapons Free Zone, even though Israel is the only state that would
make a tangible sacrifice in an exclusively nuclear free zone bargain.
Given the small time and distance factors with which Israel must
contend in terms of counteracting a potential WIM attack, Israel
would undoubtedly demand that all WMD production and delivery
systems be on the table as a precondition to negotiations. Even with
such flexibility in negotiations, Israel's poor geographic position and
her small defense force make it difficult to conceive of a situation in
which Israel would join the NPT, dismantle her undeclared nuclear
weapons program, and place all of her nuclear programs under IAEA
safeguards. Nonetheless, there have been past glimmers of hope,
such as former Prime Minister Peres' 1995 statement, made in
response to an Arab League request that Israel sign the NPT: "give
me peace and we will give up the nuclear capability."70
Pursuant to one of the many annual UN General Assembly
Resolutions calling for a Middle Eastern Zone in the summer of
1990, a UN study group met with representatives from the region to
flesh out the contours of a MEWMDZZ.7 There was surprising
commonality among Israel, Iran, and the other states on the terms of
reference for such a zone. One must assume that the MEWMDZ
treaty parties would commit neither to possess, develop, test, nor
threaten to use WMI) against another treaty party. Given the
region's volatility, the UN team studying the initiative found the
following special terms of reference necessary to build confidence
among the prospective treaty parties.7
First, the process of establishing a MEWMDZ would take many
years,. and would be linked to the overall political situation in the
region. Given the wide proliferation of chemical weapons among
Arab States, as well as Israel's nuclear capabilities, the first phase of
the MEWMDZ could, for example, include a regional undertaking to
eliminate all biological weapons to maintain qualitative symmetry in
the proposed reductions.
Second, positive security assurances (more far reaching than
69. Indeed, one must assume that the primary reason why Israel maintains its alleged
nuclear capability is to deter some type of biological or chemical attack against its homeland.
70. Dan Perry, Peres Says Mideast Should be Free of Nuclear Weapons, Associated Press,
Dec. 22,1995, available on LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
71. See UNIDIR/96/24, supra note 66, at 61.
72. See id. at 61-62.
73. See id. at 61.
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those prescribed under the NPT74) would be necessary to deal with
the diversity of WMD threats in the region.
Third, the verification regime would need to be more robust
than those prescribed in the NPT given that Iraq, a member of the
NPT, has managed to evade many IAEA inspections.
Finally, special precautions for weighted voting or veto rights
would be required to ensure that Israel was not outvoted in the
executive bodies or implementing agencies (particularly on-site
inspection agencies) created by the MEWMDZ treaty.
The UN study group did not address the role of the nuclear
weapons states within such a zone. While Iran and the other Arab
states probably would welcome a legally binding NSA by the United
States, it is difficult to conceive that Israel would prefer that the
United States' "nuclear umbrella" be encumbered for the foreseeable
future. It is commendable that the Middle East Zone sponsors have
been advocating a WMD zone versus a nuclear weapons free zone to
realistically address the widest possible array of non-proliferation
problems. But, when and if the Middle East is truly ready for
comprehensive arms control, the long-range missile programs of Iran,
Israel, Libya, and Iraq must be subject to negotiations. The exclusion
of these countries would undermine the effectiveness of any other
types of measures to eliminate WMD.
C. Northeast Asia Limited Nuclear Free Zone
The last emerging zone proposal that deserves examination is
the proposal for a "limited nuclear free zone" (LNFZ) for Northeast
Asia. The proposal arose out of a series of meetings beginning in
1991 between retired diplomats and general officers from South
Korea, Russia, Japan, China, and the United States.' The proposal is
sui generis in that it targets the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula but includes territories of Russia, Japan, China, Taiwan,
74. See S.C. Res. 255, U.N. SCOR, 1433rd mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (1968). The
"positive security assurance" is derived from U.N. Security Council Resolution 255, which
"[w]elcomes the intention expressed by certain States [Soviet Union, United States, and then
United Kingdom] that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with
the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which
nuclear weapons are used." Id This resolution was reissued by unanimous vote on 11 Apr.
1995, when the NPT was indefinitely extended. S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 3514th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/984 (1995).
75. The Georgia Institute of Technology's Center for International Strategy, Technology
and Policy has hosted approximately twelve meetings since 1991.
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Mongolia, and the United States in the zone of application-a
football-shaped ellipse 1,200 NM in radius with the Korean DMZ at
the center."
The proposed zone takes a "phased approach" to the problem of
tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. The first step
would be the creation of an "Interim Agency" that would delimit the
specific areas inside the zone and establish modalities (by systems)
and timetables for the zone's demilitarization. The initial meeting of
the Interim Agency would be in Hiroshima, where the Agency would
sponsor confidence building measures to increase dialogue and
promote cooperative relationships among the participating states. So
far as can be determined, the P-5 participants (Russia, China, and the
United States) could not be expected to provide any positive or
negative security assurances to other treaty parties (including Japan,
North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia). However, one
can imagine that the LNFZ would require the P-5 participants to
agree not to use their remote launching capability to deploy nuclear
weapons against targets inside the zone.
Once the "get-acquainted" and agency planning period ends, the
next phase would include phased or total removal of tactical nuclear
weapons in accordance with the timetables2 Strategic systems
located inside the LNFZ could be removed concurrently depending
on negotiations and agreements within the Interim Agency's
bureaucracy. Most unique, however, is the provision dictating that
once removal of nuclear weapons commences, a multinational
verification force would operate from a common headquarters and
conduct intrusive challenge inspections in the territories of the
parties to ensure that timetables were being met and guarantee that
no new nuclear weapons were being produced or introduced into the
zone. Reminiscent of President Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal, the
treaty parties would share verification technologies with the Interim
Agency to ensure that treaty objectives were being met.
There are no indications that LNFZ has moved off the drawing
board into mainstream international security and diplomatic circles.
Since the proposal would directly affect the United States' ability to
fulfill its security commitments to Korea, Taiwan and Japan,
Washington is unlikely to rapidly embrace the proposal. Similarly,
76. See John E. Endicott, Text, Senior Panel's Deliberations Draft Initial Agreement, Feb.
24,1995 (on file with Author).
77. Telephone Conversation with John Endicott, Director of CISTP, Georgia Institute of
Technology (Mar. 6,1997).
[Vol. 8:29
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES: TIME FOR A FRESH LOOK
China is not likely to warm immediately to the proposal even though
it officially advertises a "no first use" policy. A LNFZ would prevent
China from using its nuclear arsenal for intimidation purposes, or to
defend against or deter an attack by one of its neighbors (with a
smaller but far technologically superior conventional force). Finally,
although the notion of including the territories of the P-5 inside the
zone somewhat levels the playing the field, the cost, difficulty, and
political impact of reshuffling strategic systems from their current
locations in the United States, Russia, and China, combined with the
difficulty of implementing a special set of targeting rules based on the
LNFZ, create numerous practical problems that military leaders in all
three countries most likely want to avoid.
IV. NEW BUSINESS, OLD ZONES
A. U.S. Ratification of The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
The Treaty of Raratonga that created the South Pacific Nuclear
Free Zone (SPNFZ) was negotiated and signed in the mid 1980's
under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum.' It entered into force
in 1986. The Treaty area includes two U.S. possessions: Jarvis Island
and American Samoa.79 The United States has no military facilities
inside the Zone, and unlike the Treaty of Tlateloco and SEANWFZ
treaty, the zone, for most purposes, only encompasses the land
territory, internal waters, and archipelagic waters of individual
states." In 1986, Russia and China signed Protocols II (no actual or
threatened use of nuclear weapons ) and III (no testing of nuclear
weapons), although Russia made written understandings at the time
it signed the Treaty, "challenging" the treaty parties not to permit
port visits of nuclear weapons capable ships."1 The SPNFZ treaty
78. See SPNFZ, supra note 6.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Department of State, Public Statements: Soviet Signing of SPNFZ 1 (Dec. 1986) (on
file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law); Department of State, Public
Statements: Soviet Signing of SPNFZ Protocols 1 (Dec. 1986) (on file with the Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law). Russia noted that in its view states in the region were not
complying with the prohibition against stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone if they
permitted the visits of nuclear weapons capable ships and aircraft to their ports and airfields.
Article V of the treaty expressly provides that states may "decide for themselves whether to
permit .... See SPNFZ, supra note 6. Russia made no mention of this earlier understanding
in its subsequent instrument of ratification.
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places a heavy emphasis on the Zone's environmental protection.2
There are no actual or anticipated WMD threats in the region.
On 5 September 1995, the first French nuclear test at its
underground site in the Muaro Atolls galvanized public outcry for
rapid accession of the P-5 to the SPNFZ protocols-in particular the
Protocol prohibiting testing. After intense pressure by Japan,
Australia, New Zealand and other states-including the United
States, which expressed "regret" with the French tests-on 20
October 1995 the United States, France and the United Kingdom
jointly announced their intention to sign the SPNFZ protocols in
1996.8 On 27 January 1996 France completed her sixth and last
nuclear test. Noteworthy is the fact that France scaled back the
number of tests conducted from eight to six and accelerated its
completion timetable (from May to January 1996).' This completion
of testing paved the way for France to become a signatory to the
SPNFZ. On 31 March 1996, the United States, France and the UK
signed all three protocols to the Treaty of Raratonga.? France
ratified SPNFZ on 20 September 1996. If and when the U.S. Senate
gives its consent to ratification, it will mark the fourth time that the
United States has supported a regional nuclear non-proliferation
zone.
B. U.S. Ratification of The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
Since 1960, African States have sought establishment of a
nuclear free zone for the African continent. Known as the Treaty of
Pelindaba (the site of South Africa's former nuclear weapons
complex),' forty-three of the fifty-three eligible African states were
present in Cairo to sign the Treaty that created the African Nuclear
8Z See SPNFZ, supra note 6.
83. See David S. Yost, France's Nuclear Dilemma, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 108,
109. This test followed an announcement by France in August 1995 that it would accept a zero-
yield CTBT once it had completed its nuclear tests.
84. See French Nuclear Test Draws Only 'Regrets' from World Powers, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Curnws File.
85. See Australia Patches Up Nuclear Row with France, Reuters Financial Service, Sept.
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reufin File.
86. See Joint Statement by France, United Kingdom, and the United States on the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 32 WKLY. COMP. OF PRESIDENTLAL DOCS. 544 (1996).
87. See France Ratifies Nuclear-Free Treaty with South Pacific Forum, Xinhua News
Agency, Sept. 20,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
88. See David Fischer, The Pelindaba Treaty: Africa Joins the Nuclear Free World, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 9-10 (discussing South Africa Nuclear Weapons
program and the Treaty's negotiating history).
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Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ) on 11 April 1996.s The Zone
includes all of the African continent, as well as all islands that have
been declared by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to be
part of Africa. Specifically, the OAU has declared that claimed
territories of Mauritius in the Chagos Archipelago-including the
Island of Diego Garcia-are considered for ANWFZ purposes to be
part of the Continent of Africa. Therefore, the U.S. Naval Facility
leased from the British at Diego Garcia is inside the zone.
The ANWFZ Treaty and its three protocols contain the same
basic treaty party and P-5 commitments as are outlined in Figures 2
and 3. They repeat the core commitments of treaty parties to
renounce nuclear weapons, prohibit states from stationing or testing
nuclear weapons on their territory, refrain from nuclear weapons
testing on their territory, and submit to comprehensive IAEA
safeguards for peaceful nuclear activities. In addition, in Article 10
ANWFZ commits states to maintain high standards of "effective
physical protection" of nuclear materials, and in Article 11 prohibits
state parties from making, assisting, or encouraging an attack by
conventional or other means on "nuclear installations"' inside the
zone. This latter clause was probably included as a "confidence
building measure" to forbid an Osirak-like attack.9
The ANWFZ treaty provides a legally binding NSA to neither
use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons against "a party to the
treaty," or any territory within the zone for which a party is
internationally responsible (eg., French and Spanish possessions).
Further the ANWFZ has a clause in each relevant protocol requiring
twelve months advance notice of a states' intention to withdraw for
89. See Africa Pact Banning Nuclear Arms Signed, PERISCOPE DAILY DEF. NEWS
CAPSULES, Apr. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. None of the
"rogue" WMD states failed to sign on 11 April 1996 or thereafter. There are now fifty-two
signatories. Madagascar is the single African state that has not signed. Gambia and Mauritius
are the only two African states to have completed ratification. France is the single P-5 member
to have ratified the applicable Protocols, which it signed on 11 April 1996. See United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
(visited Sept. 22, 1996) <http://www.acda.gov/treaties/afnwsigs.htm>.
90. "Nuclear installations" are defined as "nuclear power and research reactors,
conversion and fabrication plants, reprocessing plants and isotope separation plants." See
ANWFZ, supra note 7.
91. See Fischer, supra note 88, at 12. Iraq's Osirak "research reactor" was destroyed by an
Israeli air attack in 1981 based on intelligence estimates that Iraq was using the facility to
develop a nuclear explosive device. The Osirak raid is discussed in Louis R. Beres & Yoash
Tsiddon-Chatto, Osirak 14 Years After, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jun. 7, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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circumstances affecting its "supreme national interests."
For two reasons, ratification of the ANWFZ treaty likely will be
controversial. First, the presence within the zone of the U.S. Naval
Facility in British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia poses
political problems.
The presence of Diego Garcia inside the Zone is political, not
treaty based. Diego Garcia occupies a "strategic" geographical
position in the middle of the Indian Ocean roughly equidistant from
the sea lanes into the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean (via the Red
Sea and the Suez Canal) and South East Asia. As a result, the
territory has served as a staging area for U.S. and other allied military
operations. During the Persian Gulf War, for example, Diego Garcia
reportedly was used as a staging area for twenty B-52's deployed as a
"calculated-ambiguous" tactical nuclear deterrent against any
chemical or biological weapons use by Iraq against U.S. forces.93
Since neither the United States nor the UK are treaty parties to
ANWFZ, but are Protocol Signatories, none of the stationing
prohibitions that are incumbent on Treaty parties apply with respect
to possible stationing of nuclear weapons on the island. As for the
territorial dispute between the U. K. and Mauritius, a ANWFZ treaty
party and a claimant to Diego Garcia, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency has concluded that the official treaty map
"adequately protect(s) U.S. interests because any resolution of the
[sovereignty] issue will occur outside of the framework of the
treaty."'  Despite the fact that ANWFZ does not pose any textual
problems with respect to the legality of continued U.S. military
operations at Diego Garcia, there is language in Article 2 of all three
Protocols (which both the United States and the United Kingdom
signed) requiring a state not to ".... contribute to any act which
constitutes a violation of this Treaty, or this Protocol."'95 That
language could be used by opponents of a U.S. nuclear capable
presence in the Indian Ocean. Practically speaking, U.S. accession to
ANWFZ has no legal significance on whether there will be political
impacts associated with DOD's continued use of Diego Garcia. But,
92. See ANWFZ, supra note 7.
93. See William M. Arkin, Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1996, at 3, 10. Arkin's source for the B-52 report was former Secretary of
State James Baker.
94. Fischer, supra note 88, at 10 (quoting an official in the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency).
95. ANWFZ Treaty, supra note 7.
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a possible harbinger of future political problems was manifest by
Russia's last minute decision not to sign the Treaty because of its
reservations with "U.S. use of the U.K.'s strategic island base of
Diego Garcia."96
The second and more substantial issue surrounding ANWFZ
ratification is the wisdom of providing a legally binding NSA to
neither use, nor threaten to use, nuclear weapons against prospective
ANWFZ parties that maintain robust biological and chemical
weapons programs and some nuclear weapons development
capabilities.' Eight of the nine Arab league states in North Africa,
including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, are already
non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT and thus the
beneficiaries of the legally binding NSA.9 The WMD proliferation
issue takes on additional significance because the relevant NSA
protocol is of indefinite duration. A protocol party may renounce its
obligations under the NSA only after giving twelve months advance
notice that its supreme national interests are threatened.' The treaty
also expressly prohibits the taking of reservations, " thereby
preventing the United States from excepting particularly nefarious
states from the guarantee of the NSA.
96. Simon Baynham, Africa-A Nuclear Free Zone, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REviEW-
POINTER, Jan. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Russia finally signed
ANWFZ a month later.
97. The French News Agency reported that "[tihe US almost balked at signing as well
because the treaty would prevent it from threatening any Libyan chemical weapons program
with a nuclear attack, sources in Washington said." See Russia Balks at Signing African
Nuclear-Free Zone, Agence France Presse, Apr. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ATP File.
98. See Fischer, supra note 88, at 13.
99. See ANWFZ, supra note 7.
100. See id.
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COUNTRY NUCLEAR CHEMICAL01  BIO- LONG RANGE
LOGICAL MISSILES' ° 2
North Korea advanced R&D advanced-extensive little data Yes, indigenously
program produced missile can
hit Japan
China yes mature mature Yes, intercontinental
program program missile capability
Iran Aggressive CWC party but has probably Yes,
R&D program extensive program advanced SCUD-C
with Chinese & since 1984 500 KM range.
Russian help. Indigenous program.
Iraq No, but No per UN, but No, but easiest No, but some long
political will remnants to restart once range systems may
may remain UN sanctions be hidden
over
Libya No. Poor R&D Past user. Extensive Uncertain Yes, has SCUD-B
base. program in 300 KM range. No
hardened facility. indigenous program
but acquisition
possible.
India Yes CWC party but BW party but Yes, 1000KM
extensive capability has capability indigenous system
being tested.
Pakistan Bomb in CWC party but BW party but No, short range
2-3 years extensive capability has capability systems only.
Figure 5"°
101. Taiwan, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Israel and Egypt have also developed or are
developing chemical weapons capability. See Thalif Deen, Tepid S. Asian Support for
Chemical Pact, ETHNIC NEWS WATCH, Aug. 23, 1996, at 10. Syria and Egypt are regarded as
being able to conduct chemical warfare. See Lessons for the NPT U.S. Nuclear Doctrine Bodes
1ll for Global Disarmament, Pacific News Service, April 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
102. South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, India and Pakistan have, or
are developing, long range missiles. Argentina terminated its medium range ballistic missile
development program but has entered into an agreement with Brazil to develop space-
launched vehicles, satellites and other space technologies. See Wyn Bowen, Ballistic Missile
Shadow Lengthens, INT'L DEF. REV.-EXTRA, Feb. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
103. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE:
APRIL 1996 (1996) [hereinafter DOD PROLIFERATION REPORT].
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The most obvious difficulty associated with an irrevocable NSA
is that the United States would be legally barred from using, or
threatening to use, nuclear weapons in response to an actual or
threatened attack of WMD against the United States, its forces, or
allies. For example, the United States would forgo the legal right to
use a tactical nuclear weapon against a deep underground target like
Tarhunah (in Libya) which is reputed to be used for the production
of chemical weapons."l Another problem associated with a legally
binding NSA involves signaling and deterrence. A rogue treaty party
would have more of an incentive to use biological or chemical
weapons against the United States or its allies at some time in the
future if the United States were limited to responding conventionally.
ANWFZ would preclude a nuclear response, and the United States
no longer considers biological and chemical weapons part of the
counter-response equation.
The final issue surrounding a legally binding NSA involves
whether or not such legal commitments undercut treaty and other
"special relationships" that the United States has with NATO and
other allies such as Israel. Even though nuclear weapons are
unpopular in some individual NATO countries, the fact remains that
since the Truman years, the United States has committed its strategic
forces to NATO to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression."5 And,
while the threat of a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack may have
diminished, the threat of a clandestine chemical attack by Libya on
NATO forces or land targets in Southern Europe is still considered
to be a real possibility. 6
At least one high ranking U.S. official has indicated that signing
the NSA contained in Protocol I would not compromise the strategic
position of the United States vis-a-vis potentially dangerous treaty
parties. Robert Bell, Special Assistant to the President for Arms
Control, noted during the U.S. announcement of its intention to sign
Protocol I of ANWFZ (the NSA) that "Protocol I will not limit
104. See Libya-April 23-Pentagon Implicitly Admits It Cannot Strike Chemical Plant,
Arab Press Service Organization, APS Diplomat Recorder, Apr. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Nwltrs File (quoting Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon, who acknowledged
that DOD is working on a series of weapons "both nuclear and conventional" to deal with deep
underground targets). See also Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Nuclear Policy in Disarray, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1996, at 2. A description of the Tarhunah facility is found in the DOD
PROLIFERATION REPORT, supra note 103, at 26-27.
105. See JEROME H. KAHAN, SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: DEVELOPING U.S.
STRATEGICARMS PoLICY 12,16,244-48 (1975).
106. See DOD PROLIFERATION REPORT, supra note 103, at iii, 25,28.
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options available to the United States in response to an attack by an
ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction."'O' This statement,
at best, has been labeled contradictory by some arms control
specialists because it directly implies that nuclear weapons could be
used in a WMD scenario. However, the language of Protocol I, the
ANWFZ treaty itself, and the United States' NPT NSA, do not list
any exceptional circumstances relevant that would suspend a
Protocol Party's unequivocal obligation neither to use, nor threaten
to use, nuclear weapons."°
No explanation has been provided to describe the legal
underpinnings for Mr. Bell's statement. One theory might be that,
when a country has exhausted all of its conventional means of
defending itself against illegal aggression, the inherent right of self-
defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter would justify
avoidance of arms control commitments."° A closely related theory
which could justify avoidance of a legally binding NSA is based on
the ICJ's holding on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: "[I]n view of the current state of international law the
court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of the State
would be at stake."'n However, this implied right of actual or
threatened use of nuclear weapons for national survival was heavily
caveated by other language in the holding. Specifically, the court
noted that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is "generally
contrary" to international law applicable to armed conflict. Further,
the court stated that any such threats or use of nuclear weapons
cannot be contrary to "specific obligations under treaties and other
undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons."'' This
convoluted advisory opinion seemingly accepts the proposition that a
nuclear weapons state is required as a matter of law to accept
107. The White House Special Briefing Topic: ANWFZ-The Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone-and the Signing of the Treaty of Pelindaba, Federal News Service, Apr. 11, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (emphasis added).
108. See Keeny, supra note 104, at 2 (adding that comments similar to those made by Mr.
Bell were made by former Secretary of Defense Perry in the context of CWC ratification);
George Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May-June 1996, at 7.
109. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
110. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, 831 (July 1996)
[hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
111. lId at 37.
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complete annihilation rather than violate an existing control treaty.
That prospect and the logical flaws in the majority holding prompted
U.S. Judge Schwebel to castigate the court for its "astounding"
evasion of the "supreme issue.., of use of force in our age," and for
failing to acknowledge the value which nuclear weapons have had in
deterring illegal behavior by rogue states."'
In an extensive article on the meaning of Mr. Bell's statement,
George Bunn writes in Arms Control Today that the legal rationale
for this "drastic change in U.S. negative security assurance policy
appears to be based on the rule of belligerent reprisal, an old rule of
customary international law that permits retaliation for an illegal act
by an enemy in war."" 3 Bunn excoriates the apparent policy of
relying upon belligerent reprisal because it undercuts the legally
binding NSA's which have been made to the "hundred or so"
countries which have or will be the recipients of legally binding
NSA's in nuclear free zones. Bunn also states that the policy
undercuts the NSA, which the United States has provided to all but a
handful of states, in the context of the indefinite extension of the
NPT.1" Bunn further argues that the United States' non-use pledge
made in the context of the NPT, though billed as a policy statement,
is legally binding,1" and that belligerent reprisal conceivably
"trumps" both sets of security assurances.1 6 The doctrine of
belligerent reprisal is a well established principal international law."7
However, if belligerent reprisal is what undergirds Mr. Bell's
statement that a "trap door" exists, we can expect that this view will
be challenged.1
112- Id. at 83.
113. Bunn, supra note 108, at 9. Bunn distinguishes between a reprisal using nuclear
weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack versus one involving retaliation for a
treaty party's use of a nuclear device. In the latter case, the United States as signatory to
Protocol I would be legally entitled to retaliate with nuclear weapons based on Article 60.2 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, since a nuclear attack would constitute a
material breach and would enable the victim to suspend its NSA against the offending state.
See id.
114. See iL at 8, 9.
115. See id. (citing Nuclear Test (Australia v. France), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267-270 (20
December); Nuclear Test (New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-475 (20 December)).
Bunn argues that since the NFT non-use pledges were made in the context of NPT treaty
negotiations to induce states to sign the NPT and the non-use pledge have been reaffirmed in a
UN Security Council Resolution, the United States' NPT NSA is a legally binding
commitment.
116. See id. at 9.
117. See id.
118. See Nuclear weapons Case, supra note 110, at 37. In the Nuclear Weapons Case the
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C. P-5 Recognition of The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone
Since the 1970s, the concept of a Southeast Asian Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) has been pushed by ASEAN
nations, usually in the context of a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace,
Friendship and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)."9  The United States'
significant military presence in the Philippines and the Soviet Navy's
perceived "Blue Water" threat to some regional states, made it
impossible for ASEAN to reach consensus on a SEANWFZ treaty.120
In early 1995, unexpected press reports stated that ASEAN had
renewed efforts to conclude a NWFZ treaty under Indonesian's
Foreign Minister Alatas, who was determined to complete work on a
SEANWFZ before Indonesia relinquished the ASEAN chair in the
summer of 1996."' The resulting SEANWFZ treaty was signed by
the ASEAN heads of state in Bangkok on 15 December 1996."
majority declined to rule on the question of nuclear weapons under a theory of belligerent
reprisal, although they noted that the peacetime use of nuclear weapons as a reprisal would be
flatly illegal. They did observe that belligerent reprisals would, like self-defense, be governed
by the principle of proportionality. See id. Judge Schwebel clearly stated in his dissenting
opinion that even if nuclear weapons were generally outlawed, belligerent reprisal could
authorize their use if, under the surrounding circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons was
otherwise proportional. Id. at 83. Schwebel added that if there was a treaty governing the use
of nuclear weapons which contained a specific prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons
"in reprisal" or in "any other circumstances" that treaty obligation would vitiate any right of
use of nuclear weapons under the doctrine of belligerent reprisal. Id. at 83. Given the
unequivocal language in ANWFZ Protocol I that parties must not use or threaten use of
nuclear weapons against a treaty party but may withdraw from ANWFZ Protocol I if their
supreme national interests are threatened (after a 12-month waiting period) it would be
difficult for any ANWFZ Protocol I party to argue that Schewel's "under any circumstances"
test does not apply since the supreme national interests clause provides states an out-albeit a
poor one-which belligerent reprisal would otherwise address.
119. See Big Powers' Doubts Pose Problems for Southeast Asia Nuclear Ban, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File. The Zone of
Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) is the precursor to SEANWFZ. In tracing the history of
ZOPFAN, Djalal, quoting from a high ranking Indonesian military responsible for ZOPFAN's
creation, notes: "the growing superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean [which] is deplored by
Indonesia values highly the tradition of an independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia
fears such a rivalry could not only lead to an armed confrontation but might also generate
undesirable pressures and demands on riparian and hinterland regions." DINO P. DJALAL,
THE GEOPOLITICS OF INDONESIA'S MARnME TERRrORIAL POLICY 104 (1996) (quoting Ali
Moertopo, Indonesia and the Indian Ocean, INST. FOR DEF. STUDIES AND ANALYSES, Jan.-
Mar. 1977, at 214. Vol IX, no. 3).
120. See U.S. Drops Its Objections to Asia Nuclear-Free Zone, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Aug. 1,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, IHT File.
121. See Pact on N-free Zone May Be Signed at ASEAN Summit, STRArrS TIMES, Oct. 14,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Strait File.
122. See Evan S. Medeiros, Southeast Asian Countries Agree to Create Nuclear-Weapon-
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Indonesia completed ratification of the SEANWFZ treaty on 12
March 1997.' z  Because Indonesia is the seventh state to ratify
SEANWZ, the Treaty will, under Article 16, enter into force once
Indonesia deposits its instruments of ratification.' 4
ASEAN's rapid conclusion of the SEAN WFZ treaty was a
success on one level, but a failure on another because the P-5 have
elected not to sign the existing SEANWFZ Protocol.' The United
States and other P-5 members conceptually support a SEANWFZ,
but require that the instrument meet established criteria that are
currently not addressed.' One reason for this failure was the lack of
regular consultation between ASEAN and the P-5 during the
developmental stages of the treaty; indeed, a draft of SEANWFZ was
not made available to the United States by ASEAN until the spring
of 1995. When it became apparent that ASEAN was moving briskly
to closure on the treaty, the P-5 pressed for consultations with
ASEAN in Jakarta
Although the November 1995 consultations resolved a number
of serious issues, insufficient time remained to resolve other issues
before the Treaty was presented to the ASEAN heads of state at the
Bangkok Summit on 15 December 1995.'8 The treaty and protocol
texts had the provisions common to other nuclear free zones
treaties.' 9 The following outstanding issues remain: (a) the inclusion
of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in the zone
of application;' (b) the extension of legally binding NSA to neither
Free-Zone, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 23; Jakarta Pushes for Draft of
ASEAN Treaty, STRAITS TIMES, July 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Strait File.
The countries include: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos.
123. See Indonesia Ratifies Southeast Asian Nuclear-Free Treaty, Japan Economic
Newswire, Mar. 12,1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File.
124. See iL
125. See Big Powers' Doubts Pose Problems for Southeast Asia Nuclear Ban, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 16,1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
126. See U.S. Says Can't Support Southeast Asian Nuke Zone, Reuters World Service, Feb.
7,1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
127. See State Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service, Dec. 8, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
128. See id.; Talks on ASEAN N-free Zone Pact End, KYODO NEWS INT'L, Nov. 27, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Intltr File.
129. See SEANWFZ, supra note 8, at arts. 3-4; id. at protocol. Cf Fig. 2 & 3.
130. See Nirmal Ghosh, US Still Concerned About ASEAN Nuclear-Arms-Free-Zone,
STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 25,1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Strait File (quoting Assistant
Secretary of State Winston Lord); U.S. Dept. of State, Daily Press Briefing, 8 Dec. 1995 (visited
5 Dec. 1997) <gopher:llgopher.state.gov:70/00ftp%3ADOSFan%3AGopher%3A02%
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"use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons inside the zone"
irrespective of whether the recipient of the NSA is a treaty party, an
eligible treaty party that has not ratified, or a fellow nuclear weapons
state;... and (c) inclusion of language that creates ambiguity regarding
the right of treaty parties to grant or deny port visits of nuclear
capable ships and aircraft."
ASEAN plans to meet with members of the P-5 to chart a
strategy to address the above concerns by "amending the protocol to
addressing a major U.S. concern of including the EEZ and
continental shelves in the zone of application will require legal
finesse since ASEAN is unlikely to want to disturb a treaty that has
already entered into force."' '3 Also, ASEAN's use of the Protocol to
exact NSAs among the P-5 is something which the United States and
other P-5 members have never done. The implications of cross-
connecting NSA's among the P-5 on a regional level is sure to be
controversial.
V. FLAWS IN U.S. PRACTICE TOWARDS ZONES
A. U.S. Participation In Zone Proposals Is Not Essential Or
Mandated By The NPT Or Any Other Global Obligations
For regional states, the legally binding NSA and the
commitments not to test by the P-5 are the two "crown jewels" of a
nuclear free zone. Given that a politically if not legally binding NSA
has been given by the United States and other states in the NPT
context, 4 and that the P-5 have all committed to end nuclear
weapons testing by signing the CTBT, 35 P-5 participation in most of
the current zones awaiting ratification does not add much to the
20Public%2OAffairs%3APress%2OBriefings%20-%2OConferences%3A1995%2Press
%20Briefings%3A9512%2OPress%2OBriefings%3A951208%2ODaily%2OBriefing>; U.S. Says
Can't Support Southeast Asian Nuke Zone, Reuters World Service, Feb. 7, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File (quoting ACDA's Thomas Graham); Lee Siew Hua,
Arms-Free Zone Pact Must Have N-Powers' Backing to Be Effective, THE STRAITS TIMES, Dec.
12, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Strait File.
131. See Evan S. Medeiros, Southeast Asian Countries Agree to Create Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-Zone, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 23.
132 See Winston Lord, Southeast Asia Regional Security Issues: Opportunities for Peace,
Stability, and Prosperity, 7 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 27, 1996, at 267.
133. ASEAN to Amend Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty to Get Major Powers Support,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTuR, Oct. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, DPA File.
134. See infra note 151.
135. See CTBT, supra note 4.
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security of regional states. Yet, it is fairly clear that nuclear free
zones have played some part in helping solve problems. Consider,
for example, when one examines the interplay between the
announcement by the United States, United Kingdom and France to
sign SPNFZ, and the eventual decision by France to discontinue its
nuclear weapons testing,' the role that Tlateloco played in coaxing
Argentina and Brazil to abandon their nuclear weapons program,"
and the potential role that a limited nuclear free zone could play in a
NATO enlargement context." Given the continued movement
towards globalization of nuclear non-proliferation norms through the
NPT and CTBT, and the limited role of zones in the past, it is not
clear that complete U.S. endorsement, i.e., formal U.S. (or P-5)
accession to all applicable protocols, advances U.S. security or non-
proliferation objectives, or is required for the purpose of providing
leadership.
U.S. accession to most nuclear free zone treaties (with the
possible exception of a Central European Zone) has only marginal
impact on the national security of the United States, but may in fact
encourage unwelcome WMD behavior by rogue states. This
situation of marginal or no-impact is clear in the case of the Treaty of
Raratonga. From the standpoint of the treaty parties, the obligations
by the P-5 neither to threaten the use of nuclear weapons nor to test
inside the zone have been substantially delivered in the CTBT139 and
in the context of the NPT."4 From the perspective of safeguarding
U.S. security interests, there is no likelihood that the governments of
Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, or New Caledonia are likely to become
a WMD proliferation threat to the United States or their neighbors,
or to become allied with countries that threaten this type of activity.
Under these circumstances, the provision of an additional legally
binding NSA to countries in a region that has no proliferation
dangers contributes nothing, and dilutes the value of the NSA the
United States has already provided in the NPT.
Legal support for direct participation in Nuclear Free Zones is
wanting. Nuclear Free Zones take their place in the overall quilt of
136. See Yost, supra note 83, at 108, 109; French Nuclear Test Draws Only 'Regrets' from
World Powers, WvASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Curnws File;
Australia Patches Up Nuclear Row with France, supra note 85.
137. See, e.g., Tollefson, supra note 52.
138. See NVFZC&EE, supra note 53, at 8.
139. See CTBT, supra note 4, at art. I.
140. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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global treaties by Article VII of the NPT, which states "Nothing in
this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude
regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in
their respective territories." 141 Conspicuously absent from the text of
Article VII is any mention of the role of the P-5 as guarantors of
regional treaties; indeed, Article VI of the NPT establishes that the
primary legal obligations of all NPT parties (the P-5 in particular) is
to support "general and complete disarmament and an end to the
nuclear arms race" on what one must assume is a global level. 4
Moreover, to the extent that P-5 participation has somehow come to
be regarded as obligatory because of the normalization of four
treaties in which a P-5 role is envisioned, it must be recalled that the
United States is only a full party to one nuclear free zone treaty: The
Treaty of Tlateloco, which was negotiated, signed and ratified at the
height of the Cold War, in the sunset of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
in a context where regional states such as Argentina and Brazil had
aspirations to become nuclear weapons states. That negotiating
dynamic is not present in any of the current zones under
examination, and the United States has never deviated from its policy
of pursuing zone proposals on a case-by-case basis.
The other argument heard in arms control circles is that arms
control leadership requires U.S. accession to existing nuclear
weapons free protocols. The United States has a long history of
supporting a variety of comprehensive, global arms control efforts.
As the remaining superpower, the United States should exercise
extreme caution in providing legally binding NSA's outside of the
NPT. The sole possible exception in the short-term might be to
facilitate NATO enlargement and prevent a dangerous new nuclear
arms race with Russia. A resume of U.S. commitments to global
nuclear arms control has evolved.
For example, the United States is a party to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco (establishing the Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone), 4* the Antarctic Treaty,' 4 the Seabed 45 and Outer Space Arms
141. NPT, supra note 1, at art. VII.
142. See id. at art. VI.
143. See Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, Apr. 1, 1968, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 762; Additional Protocol I to the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, May 26, 1977, 33 U.S.T.
1792,634 U.N.T.S. 362.
144. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 30.
145. See Seabed Treaty, supra note 34.
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Control treaties."
In October 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev committed to
eliminate or not to deploy almost all tactical nuclear weapons.147 This
was subsequently confirmed by President Yeltsin.1 4 President Bush
committed the United States to "eliminate its... worldwide
inventory of... theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and
destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic
missile warheads... [and] withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons
from... surface ships, attack submarines... as well as nuclear bombs
aboard aircraft carriers."1 49
In May 1995, the United States provided critical leadership to
meet an important global goal of persuading the international
community to support an indefinite extension of the NPT. Arguably
the single most important non-proliferation treaty in existence and
nearly universally accepted, the NPTm commits nuclear weapons
states not to transfer nuclear weapons technology, while at the same
time committing non-nuclear weapons states to forgo the
development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Of course, an
essential external component of the overall NPT package is the
United States' negative security assurance policy, first announced on
12 June 1978, and reaffirmed in April 1995. This policy states that
the United States will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against
any state which complies with the NPT."'
146. See Outer Space, supra note 33.
147. See Serge Schmemann, Gorbachev Matches U.S. on Nuclear Cuts and Goes Further on
Strategic Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at 1.
148. See Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin Tells Russians of Arms Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1992, at A8.
149. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK 1992:
WORLD ARnimENs AND DISARMAMENr 85 (1992).
150. "There are now only five states worldwide outside the NPT regime, (Brazil, Cuba,
India, Israel, and Pakistan)." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Commitment to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Apr. 2,1997) <http://www.acda.govl
factshee/wmd/nuclear/npt/comnnpt.htm>.
151. See Cyrus Vance, U.S. Assurance on Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Aug. 1978, at 52 (quoting President Carter, "The United States will not use nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear-weapons state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally
binding commitment no to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on
the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-
weapons state or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the
attack."); Vice President Al Gore, The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Indefinite
Extension, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, 24 Apr. 1995, at 353. The 1995 statement was endorsed
unanimously by the UN Security Council. See S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3514th
mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/984 (1995).
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On 11 August 1995, in the face of concerns that nuclear weapons
tests of some yield were militarily required to safeguard the safety
and reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles,15"2 the United States
unilaterally announced that it would accede to a zero yield test ban.
France and the United Kingdom followed with similar
announcements. In addition to the factual test ban, the United States
signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996."
U.S. leadership in the context of START I, START I, and
cooperative threat reduction programs resulted in removal of nuclear
weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan.-
The United States provided critical leadership in the worldwide
effort to eliminate the most pernicious types of anti-personnel
landmines, and the Clinton Administration is staking considerable
political capital to obtain Senate advice and consent on the CWC.
Because the United States has demonstrated its credentials on a
variety of global and regional arms control fronts, support for nuclear
free zones can take different forms. In cases where U.S. accession to,
or support of, a nuclear free zone is neutral or would have negative
strategic or political consequences, the United States should be
prepared to sign less than all of the available protocols.
Alternatively, the United States could agree to make a policy
statement similar to the NPT policy statement, outlining its
voluntarily adherence to some or all of the Zone's provisions, without
becoming legally entangled in its complexities. For example, the
United States could make an irrevocable policy decision not to
station nuclear weapons in a given region. In other cases, the United
States could simply "commend" the regional activity, but not take
any special legal or policy action."
B. U.S. Participation in Some Zones Dilutes the Value of Global
Arms Control Efforts
Continuing U.S. support for nuclear free zone treaties may in the
152- See Transcript of White House Press Briefing by Special Assistant to the President for
Defense Policy Robert Bell, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
USNWR File; Britian Backs Total Ban on Nuclear Test Explosions, Reuters N. Amer. Wire,
Sept. 14,1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtflws File.
153. See CIBT, supra note 4.
154. See DOD PROLIFERATION REPORT, supra note 103, at 29-33.
155. The United States' policy statement would have to stress the commendatory action as
an expression of policy and articulate why the United States is not formally becoming a
protocol party, otherwise, the action may be perceived as complete acquiescence and a
provision lapsing into customary international law.
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aggregate dilute the quality of the promises, and minimize the
importance of global international legal regimes designed to cope
with the manufacture, production, stockpiling and use of WMD. The
United States' policy with regard to chemical weapons, nuclear
weapons testing and landmines illustrates this point.
Since 1975, the United States has been an adherent to the
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare,"6 which bans the first use in war of chemical
weapons."7 Since retaliatory use under the Geneva Protocol is
permitted, the United States maintained a robust "defensive"
chemical weapons capability until 1985, when public law directed that
steps be taken in advance of a comprehensive chemical weapons
convention to eliminate the stockpiles of all lethal chemical agents
and munitions in conjunction with U.S. acquisition of binary chemical
weapons.' s In the intervening years, much of the aging U.S. stockpile
has been destroyed, with only thirty thousand tons remaining. Of the
remaining stockpiles, the United States has "made a decision,
whether or not this treaty (CWC) is ratified, to destroy those
stockpiles. We don't need chemical weapons to deter their use by
others."'5 9 According to Secretary of Defense Cohen, chemical
weapons destruction activities are "well under way" towards the 2004
scheduled completion date.'6' In the case of nuclear weapons testing
(a key step in the development of any next generation nuclear
weapons), the United States announced support for a zero-yield
CTBT and discontinued all nuclear testing before the United States
signed the CTBT and before it became apparent that India and
Pakistan would probably boycott the CTBT. Finally, in the case of
landmines, the United States signed a package of amendments to
156. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun. 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 573, 94
L.N.T.S. 65, 67 (entered into force for United States 10 Apr. 1975) [hereinafter Geneva Gas
Protocol]; see generally U.S. NAVY, LAW OF THE NAVAL WARFARE, NWP-9 section 10.3
(1989).
157. The United States ratified the Protocol subject to a reservation that the Protocol
would not be binding on chemical weapons use during war if another country used such
weapons first. See Geneva Gas Protocol, supra note 156, at 571.
158. See 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (1994).
159. Interview by Bob Deans with John Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Convention A Tool for Dealing with Rogue Nations, Terrorists, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 10,1997, at A14.
160. See Walter R. Mears, Walter Mears: The Stalling of a Treaty, Associated Press Political
Service, Feb. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2502618.
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Protocol II of the CCW in 1996 to restrict the use of anti-personnel
mines.161 However, only two weeks after the amendments to the
CCW were completed, the United States took unilateral steps to
immediately ban "dumb" anti-personnel mines except on the Korean
Peninsula," even though other countries, such as China, Russia,
India and Pakistan do not support such a ban.
In all of these recent cases, the United States made significant
unilateral disarmament decisions to advance global arms control.
These decisions certainly score points in humanitarian circles, but
national security specialists need to consider whether the United
States is obtaining and delivering good value for its treaty
commitments when it unilaterally assumes many serious treaty
obligations without obtaining any reciprocal treaty benefits. From a
peer competitor's standpoint or from the view of potential
proliferation, the sincerity of the U.S. statement that universal
accession to CTBT and CWC is important must be viewed with
skepticism. After all, the United States has unilaterally elected to
disarm before acquiring benefits under the treaties, and is not waiting
to coax reluctant states to join these important global treaties. As
long as states remain outside of the treaty context, the United States
has less legal leverage to modify state behavior.
C. Participation in Too Many Zones Will Cause a Failure of WMD
Deterrence
The April 1996 DOD Report, "Proliferation: Threat and
Response," contains a comprehensive assessment of major and
immediate WMD proliferation threats.1" In this report, former
Secretary of Defense William Perry argues that these threats must
be: (1) reduced through dismantlement and safeguards programs; (2)
deterred by maintaining strong conventional and nuclear forces; and
(3) defended against through counterproliferation programs.1"
The most obvious reason why U.S. accession to various nuclear
free zones may increase WMD proliferation is due to the WMD
mismatch that most nuclear free zone treaties create. In a typical
case, a P-5 protocol party, unless it exercises its right of withdrawal
and waits the three to twelve months specified in the treaty, is barred
161. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
163. See Figure 4.
164. See DOD PROLIFERATION REPORT, supra note 103, at iv.
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by the text from using nuclear weapons against a treaty party in all
cases.' 6' On the other hand, treaty parties are insulated from a P-5
nuclear attack as long as they do not use or acquire nuclear
weapons." For example, according a literal reading of the text of
ANWFZ, the United States would be precluded from using or
threatening nuclear weapons in response to the use of biological or
chemical weapons by a rogue state.67
A failure of deterrence in the nuclear age can have devastating
effects, especially when the aggressor facing the United States
threatens the initial or repeated use of WMD-most likely some type
of chemical weapon-against U.S. or allied targets. Particularly
vulnerable are U.S. allies that rely on U.S. security assurances, some
nuclear, to obtain local military supremacy. Since the beginning of
the nuclear age, there has been little empirical data to determine
whether the legal right to use nuclear weapons has restrained
aggressive state behavior, particularly that involving WMD.
However, Kagan's definitive On the Origins of War and the
Preservation of Peace lays out a convincing historical argument that
global arms control can be destabilizing.'6 He examines the
destabilizing effects of the U.S. and British decisions to restrict
unilaterally the development of bases in the Philippines and Hong
Kong, and to compromise naval superiority at the 1921-22
Washington Naval Conference and the 1930 London Naval
Conference.169 In Kagan's view, these well-meaning disarmament
measures afforded Japan local military supremacy which effectively
provided Japan with the tacit encouragement to invade Manchuria in
1931, and later may have emboldened Japan to attack the United
States. 7 An ill-considered nuclear free zone can have destabilizing
consequences and give a rogue state local military supremacy.
On the other hand, direct and indirect indications of U.S. resolve
to use nuclear weapons contributed positively to de-escalation of
potential WMD scenarios. In 1962, in response to saber rattling by
Khrushchev to blockade West German access to Berlin following
erection of the Berlin Wall, then Attorney General Robert Kennedy
165. See ANWFZ, supra note 7, Protocol I, arts. I, VI, 35 I.L.M. at 718.
166. See id. Protocol I, art. I, at 718; see also id. art. mI, at 707.
167. See id. Protocol I, arts. I, IV, at 718; see also id. arts. I, VI, at 707-08.
168. See generally DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE PRESERVATION
OF PEACE (1995).
169. See id. at 330-31.
170. See iL at 330-34.
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said, "I would hope that in the last few weeks [Khrushchev] would
have come to the realization that the President will use nuclear
weapons."'7' At the height of the Cuban missile crisis, the United
States announced that it would regard a Cuban attack on the United
States as "requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union," and placed U.S. military forces on general alert and strategic
forces on full alert.' The last, and possibly most relevant incident,
was a letter dated 5 January 1991 from President Bush to Sadaam
Hussein on the eve of Operation Desert Storm.7 ' It contained the
following warning: "The United States will not tolerate the use of
chemical or biological weapons... you will be held directly
responsible... [t]he American people would demand the strongest
possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price.""'
Secretary Baker's memoirs relate an even livelier verbal exchange in
which former Secretary Baker says he, "purposely left the impression
that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite a
tactical nuclear retaliation."' 7 5 And, it was this very episode which
prompted Vice-President Schwebel of the International Court of
Justice to conclude that there were circumstances in which actual or
threatened use of nuclear weapons would be legally justified under
humanitarian law principles:
[A]s long as... "rogue states" menace the world (whether they are
or are not Parties to the NPT), it would be imprudent to set policy
on the basis that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful
"in any circumstance." Indeed, it may not only be rogue States but
criminals or fanatics whose threats or acts of terrorism conceivably
may require a nuclear deterrent or response.1
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The historical examples discussed above establish that
possession and, at rare moments, threatened use of nuclear weapons
can play a useful role in deterring illegal conduct.' For this reason, a
legally binding NSA by the United States in the context of ANWFZ,
171. 1d at 489.
172. Id. at 521.
173. See Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush's Letter to President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq, 1 PUB. PAPERS 36 (Jan. 12, 1991) [hereinafter President Bush Letter].
Aziz reportedly read the "rude" letter but refused to deliver it to Saddam Hussein. See Gerald
F. Seib & Robert S. Greenberger, Hope for Peace in Gulf Falters as Baker, Aziz Get Nowhere
in Talks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1991, at Al.
174. President Bush's Letter, supra note 173.
175. JAMEs A. BAKER, III, TIE POLIs OF DIPLOMACY 359 (1995).
176. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 110, 35 I.L.M. at 842 (Schwebel, V.P., dissenting).
177. One could examine other historical examples or psychological studies that address
deterring totalitarian regimes from the use of weapons of mass destruction.
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MEWMD, and the Korean LNFZ could easily be misinterpreted by
an aggressor. Potential aggressors are aware that the United States
has dismantled its chemical and biological programs, and additional
legal restraints on the United States' actual or threatened use of
nuclear weapons dilutes flexible deterrence. The legally binding
NSA also allows rogue states to venture the conclusion that the
United States would be unwilling to sustain large combat losses to
respond conventionally to an illegal use of WMD against non-U.S.
territories.
In both CWC and ANWFZ, the White House has stated inter
alia that the United States retains the right to respond to a WMD
attack against U.S. troops or U.S. allies with overwhelming force.'
Assuming that George Bunn is correct that belligerent reprisal is the
legal basis for these statements,'7 9 it is urged that this doctrine should
remain in the shadows of U.S. foreign policy, and not be used to
resuscitate a deeply flawed arms control design. Belligerent reprisal
or expansive self-defense theory, though they address deterrence
concerns, also create confusion, because the White House has not
clarified publicly its position. In addition, the statement that "all"
options are available directly contradicts the unequivocal language in
the ANWFZ and NPT NSA that nuclear weapons will not be used if
certain conditions unrelated to biological or chemical weapons use
are met.Y In the final analysis, invocation of the belligerent reprisal
doctrine or some other new theory also casts doubt on the value of all
the United States' arms control commitments. This could be
dangerous if misread by nuclear peer competitors like China or
Russia. Rather than invoke a controversial and narrow principle of
customary international law or establish new principles, the United
States is better advised to refrain from signing ANWFZ, and
subsequently to retain the legal right to use nuclear weapons to hold
the Libyan regime at risk for WMD.
D. Participation in Too Many Zones May Spawn More Ad Hoc
Zones that Undermine U.S. Military Operations or Challenge
Other International Norms.
U.S. policy on nuclear free zones mandates that zone proposals
receive some regional standing and include all important states in the
178. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
179. See Bunn, supra note 108, at 9.
180. See ANWFZ, supra note 7, art. III, Protocol I, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 707,718; NPT, supra
note 1, arts. I-II, 21 U.S.T. at 486-89.
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region." For this reason, the United States has not publicly
supported past attempts by individual states like Mongolia or city-
states in Northern Italy to set themselves apart as nuclear free
enclaves'8 The United States also has not supported attempts by
some states to create zones which encompass the high seas, such as
the ZOPFAN, which incorporated most of the Indian Ocean, or the
current Southern Hemisphere proposal which unites Tlateloco,
SEANWFZ, Antarctica and SPNFZ with the adjacent areas of the
high seas.'"
Ad hoe zones may appear morally justified under the rubric of
self-determination, but from an international security perspective
they can undermine the free movement of military and non-military
units and cargoes and may undermine a state's good faith compliance
with major post World War II mutual defense agreements such as the
North Atlantic Treaty. Also, unless there is near universal
participation by states in the region, the zone arrangements lose the
self-enforcing verification mechanism that is essential to any nuclear
arms control agreement. In the case of zones that borrow areas of
the high seas for some purported security regime, the restrictions
imposed on high seas freedoms undermine fundamental principles of
customary international law, which stipulate that no state or group of
states can subject the seas to such regimes because they are the
common property of the international community at large."
Thus far, the United States has held the line on not supporting
zones that reflect the characteristics of those described above.
However, U.S. ratification or support of zones such as SPNFZ that
do not materially contribute to U.S. or regional security may
stimulate the interest of individual or groups of states or NGOs to
push for more denuclearization. While this is a noble goal, the U.S.
Navy has suffered from movements with a "nuclear free" slogan. For
example, Greenpeace's Nuclear Free Seas Campaign sought to
interfere with the operations of the U.S. Navy's nuclear powered
vessels, particularly the submarine force, in the late 1980s and early
1990s." 5 U.S. Navy ships no longer carry tactical nuclear weapons,"
181. See Figure 1.
182. See Mongolia's New Policy Options, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE RIv., Aug. 1, 1995, at 5,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Mongolia claims support of its zone from the
five nuclear weapons states. See id. Corroboration of Mongolia's claim is not available.
183. See supra note 47 and accompanying text on the Southern Hemisphere proposal.
184. See GROTIuS, MARE LIBERUM 36-39 (1608).
185. See Nuclear Navies Target of Greenpeace Effort, J. COMMERCE, Jul. 13, 1987, at 8B.
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but states continue to discriminate against vessels because they are
nuclear powered,'' despite the Law of the Sea Convention's basic
norm that means of propulsion is not a valid basis for discriminating
against the passage of vessels."' Given the resource-constrained
environment in which DOD must now operate, the proliferation of
new zones-recognized or unrecognized-creates additional
difficulties for American military planners who have an ever-
diminishing number of U.S. military facilities on foreign soil to use as
staging areas for future military operations.' 9 Practically speaking,
there is not much the United States can do to restrain the growth of
regional or sub-regional nuclear free zones. However, the United
States needs to be very selective in supporting future zones and
outspoken in its opposition to zones that do not conform to
established criteria. To do otherwise invites international acceptance
of "zone creep" which may, in the final analysis, complicate DOD's
ability to plan for and conduct military operations around the globe.
VI. NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AND NATO
Both the African Nuclear Free Zone and the Central European
Zones have NATO implications: the former because it weakens
defense of the NATO's Southern Flank, and the latter because a
Nuclear Free Zone could create a treaty barrier to full integration
into NATO of former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and perhaps Romania and Slovenia.
The Central and Eastern European Nuclear Free Zone
(CEENWFZ) is the single zone which deserves priority attention of
U.S. policymakers, given the political dynamics of NATO
enlargement and the transformation of the Russian military
industrial complex. The Clinton Administration has made NATO
enlargement a top foreign policy priority even though Russia says
that it is opposed to any NATO membership which gives "any
neighbor an attack capability that goes beyond present defense
systems."' ' Assuming that NATO enlargement is a U.S. priority,
186. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
187. See New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, No. 86
(1997) (N.2). Section 11 provides: "Visits by nuclear powered ships-Entry into the internal
waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear
power is prohibited." Id.
188. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, at art. 23.
189. See Charles Aldinger, U.S. Moves to Close More Bases at Home, Abroad, Reuters N.
Amer. Wire, Jul. 13,1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
190. William Drozdiak, Russia, NATO Near Agreement on Structure of New Partnership,
1997
68 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW
serious consideration of a Central European Nuclear Free Zone
proposal would advance the basic goal of NATO enlargement, but
would relieve pressure on the Russian military to upgrade and
modernize its strategic nuclear forces.'
Critics of a CEENWFZ will argue that NATO enlargement must
be a seamless transaction, and states must accept the stationing of
nuclear weapons on their territory to fulfill their obligations under
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty." Article Five binds NATO
members to assist one another in the event of an attack, and includes
access and bases for NATO strategic forces." Even though the
North Atlantic Treaty has been regarded by many as sacrosanct, the
reality is that there are exceptions around the edges of the treaty for
Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and most recently Spain, all of whom
have unilaterally declared that they do not accept the stationing of
nuclear weapons in their territory in peacetime."' Furthermore, in
1991, the United States and the other Four Powers agreed that the
former East Germany could be part of NATO, but could not accept
the introduction of foreign troops or nuclear weapons.9 This
agreement may be a key precedent for determining how former
Warsaw Pact countries can and should be integrated into NATO with
minimum friction with Moscow.
CEENWFZ does not present any particular challenges to the
basic zone mechanics: provisions addressing non-possession, no-use
or no threatened use, verification, and non-stationing"6 are all
workable. All of the prospective parties are members in good
standing of the NPT, and most are parties to the CTBT, '9 giving a
WASH. POST, Mar. 12,1997, at A23.
191. Consider the 22 March 1997 Helsinki Summit at which President Clinton cited the 10
December 1996 North Atlantic Council decision that "NATO members have 'no intention, no
plan and no reason' to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now
members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so." Russia-United States
Joint Statement on European Security, 33 WKLY. COmp. PRES. Doc. 392, 393 (Mar, 21, 1997).
At the same March 1997 summit, both Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin candidly reported in a
joint statement that they "continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement." Id.
Until any summit agreement is fully negotiated and vetted through the legislatures of both
countries, it is appropriate to skeptically view any announcement that the NATO enlargement
problem has been solved.
192. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 59.
193. See id
194. See NWFZC & EE, supra note 53, at 16.
195. See Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, supra note 54, at 1191.
196. See NWFZC & EE, supra note 53, at 17-18.
197. See Jan Prawitz, Closing Gaps (Feb. 20, 1997) (prepared for 25th Pugwash Workshop
on Nuclear Forces, 25-27 Oct. 1996, on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative &
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high degree of confidence that the non-possession test could be met.
The non-stationing measure also is "ripe for implementation as there
are presently no nuclear weapons deployed in the territories of the
potential zonal states."1'9  The legally binding negative security
assurance and "no threat" assurance are, of course, consistent with
security assurances already in place pursuant to the NPT.2 The final
piece, verification, would not be difficult to implement since the
IAEA now is operating full-scope safeguards in all of the prospective
zonal states.20'
Apart from the immediate NATO enlargement issue, the
abysmal performance of Russian troops in the Chechen uprising is
likely to underscore the importance of the nuclear arsenal in Russian
defense planning to deter far better armed and technologically
advanced NATO forces. Indeed, one Russian arms control
commentator remarked that there has been an "alarming" number of
Russian "letters to the editor," urging a resumption of nuclear
modernization and tests.' If conventional forces have been de facto
removed from the defense planning equation for Russia, one can
conceive of scenarios where some successor Russian government is
forced to use nuclear weapons to enforce its national will against a
NATO adversary. Unless nuclear forces are taken off the table by
treaty, the temptation will exist for nuclear forces to be used so long
as the readiness of Russian conventional forces remains in decline.
The bottom line is this: A properly drawn CEENWFZ could
advance and solidify NATO enlargement while at the same time
helping to advance strategic arms reductions with Russia. Adherence
to CEENWFZ by the United States, United Kingdom, France and
NATO enlargement states would provide a legal rationale for
modifying the Article 5 commitments of NATO enlargement states.
These countries' participation in a "sanctioned" nuclear weapons free
zone provides a legal rationale for not demanding that the terms for
NATO membership include the stationing of nuclear weapons on
their territory. A CEENWFZ which includes accession by the
NATO enlargement states themselves, and relevant former Soviet
International Law).
198. See CTBT, supra note 4, Annex 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1458.
199. Letter from J. Prawitz to Author, supra note 47, at 17.
200. See supra note 74.
201. See NWFZC & EE, supra note 53, at 20.
202. See Vladimir Chumak, A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe: Possibilities and
Expectations, 2 YADERNY KONTROL 12 (1996).
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Republics (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia), and includes a commitment
by the P-5 not to station nuclear weapons in the zone, is likely to be
one of the most durable and respected methods of legally dealing
with nuclear weapons and NATO enlargement. It also is possible
that a very narrowly drawn CEENWFZ could help in shaping a final
solution for other bilateral arms control issues, including CFE,
START II ratification, and the ABM Treaty Ballistic Missile
Defense.
VII. UPDATING THE ANTIQUATED U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS NW ZONES
The United States' policy towards nuclear weapons free zones
was born in the mid-1960s when the United States considered
whether to join the Treaty of Tlateloco.20 It is time that the United
States recognizes that the Cold War is over, and that proliferation
threats today are more diverse, with chemical and biological weapons
perhaps the greatest immediate threat. Five corollaries to the basic
U.S. policy are proposed.
A. Principle 1. The United States Should Promote WMID Vice
Nuclear Free Proposals.
The United States already provides robust nuclear guarantees in
the NPT context in exchange for states' cooperation not to acquire
illicit nuclear weapons technologies or nuclear weapons. This NPT
commitment is free standing, and does not create a moral or legal
obligation on the United States to support single-purpose nuclear
weapons free zones.2 Given that some states which present
immediate proliferation threats are not party to the 1997 CWC
(Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria), the 1975 Biological Weapons
Convention (Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Sudan), or the basic 1925
Geneva Protocols which ban use of biological or chemical weapons,'
the promotion of WMD zones is the most sensible policy for the
United States to pursue. If part of the bargain calls for the United
States to provide a legally binding NSA to the treaty parties, WMD
zones at least address the current mismatch present in the ANWFZ.
203. See flateloco, supra note 19.
204. See NPT, supra note 1.
205. See U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, A ZONE FREE OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCriON IN THE MIDDLE EAST at 67, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/96/24, U.N. Sales No.
GV.E.96.0.19 (1996); Convention on the Prohibition, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27,
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B. Principle 2. The United States Should Directly Caveat the
Legally Binding Negative Security Assurance to States Which
Have a Poor History of Adhering to Non-proliferation Regimes
or Which Use Weapons of Mass Destruction.
If negotiation of a WMD zone becomes unwieldy, or there are
good reasons for the United States to provide a legally binding NSA,
the United States should take a more flexible approach to provide
NSA in zone treaties. While all nuclear free zone treaties prohibit
reservations, it would not be inappropriate (and would not defeat the
object and purpose of such a treaty) for a protocol party to accede to
the treaty, but stipulate that the U.S. NSA would be suspended
against a treaty party making actual or imminent use of WMD. A
policy of apparent reliance on belligerent reprisal or some other
unstated theory may be confusing vis-h-vis U.S. commitments to
other global arms control treaties, and may not provide sufficient
signaling to a potential WMD aggressor. Moreover, use of an
unstated doctrine may cast doubt on the U.S. policy of promoting the
rule of law if there is an international perception that the rules relied
upon (e.g., belligerent reprisal) are not universally accepted or
understood.
C. Principle 3: The United States Should Not Support Zone
Proposals Which Directly or Indirectly Interfere With Global
Operations of U.S. Military Forces.
1. Visitation Policies Must be Upheld. The four existing NWFZ
treaties (ANWFZ, SPNFZ, SEAN WFZ, TLATELOLCO) have
provisions which allow states to decide for themselves whether to
permit nuclear weapons capable ships and aircraft to visit their ports
or airfields.6 At face value, these provisions protect the DOD's
worldwide operations. However, the very aggressive definition of
U.N. Doc. A/47/27/Appendix 1 (1992), reproduced at 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163;
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 806, 94
L.N.T.S. 65.
206. See ANWFZ, supra note 7, art. 4.2; SPNFZ, supra note 6, art. 5.2; SEANFWZ, supra
note 8, art. 7. Although this is not expressly stated in Tlateloco, the U.S. Senate consented to
ratification of Protocols I and 2 subject to the following understandings: that the provisions did
not affect the rights of contracting parties to "grant or deny transport or transit privileges" to
foreign vessels or affect freedom of the seas. See ACDA Agreements, supra note 9, at 66-67.
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stationing' creates questions as to whether these clauses are truly
neutral with respect to whether states should permit such visits. For
example, Article 7 of SEANWFZ contains a standard provision that
each State Party "may decide for itself whether to allow visits by
foreign ships and aircraft."' Yet, Article 3(2)( A) requires that each
State Party not allow any other state to "possess or have control over
nuclear weapons" or "station nuclear weapons" in its territory2 9 At
a minimum, this awkward formulation creates internal doubt as to
whether port visits are permissible.
With a shrinking number of foreign bases, ships, and aircraft,
DOD must rely on foreign sea and airport access so that its forces
can respond to a geographically diverse number of tasks to be
performed in the littorals. These include sanctions enforcement in
the Persian Gulf, patrols in the Adriatic (to deal with streams of
refugees and interdiction of arms), the non-combatant evacuation of
places throughout Africa, a plethora of counterdrug activities in the
Caribbean and the Pacific, the rebuilding of Haiti, and the assurance
of a peaceful settlement of differences between China and Taiwan.
To sustain these operations and maintain presence, foreign port
access by nuclear weapons capable ships and aircraft is essential.
The Russian understandings to the SPNFZ Treaty,'1  the refusal
of Russia to sign ANWFZ as an oblique protest of continued U.S. use
of Diego Garcia,21' and ASEAN's selection of ambiguous language in
the final SEANWFZ Treaty,212 all suggest a subtle political
undercurrent that nuclear weapons capable naval units are
unwelcome in foreign ports and airfields, despite the best efforts of
U.S. negotiators to ensure that NWFZ treaties contain text which is
totally neutral. Much of the debate over the presence of nuclear
weapons capable units should have subsided with the United States'
1991 policy decision to remove all of its tactical nuclear weapons
from its surface vessels and aircraft.2"3 However, New Zealand's
207. "'Stationing' means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland
waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment." SPNFZ, supra note 6, art. I(d).
208. SEANWFZ, supra note 8, at 642.
209. Id. at 640.
210. In its 1986 accession to the SPNFZ, Russia stated in an understanding that "the
permission of transit of nuclear weapons ... in any form and the calls at the ports and airfields
within the limits of the nuclear free zone of foreign ships ... is incompatible with the nuclear
free status of the zone." Soviet Signing of SPNFZ Protocols, supra note 81, at 1.
211. See Baynham, supra note 96.
212. See supra note 132.
213. See Presidential Initiative on Nuclear Arms (visited Sept. 11, 1997) <http://www.acda.
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domestic law implementing the SPNFZ contains a stand alone
provision banning the visits of nuclear powered and nuclear weapons
capable ships or aircraft."' Indonesia also is seeking international
support for routing nuclear powered and nuclear weapons capable
vessels in connection with its designation of sea lanes through its
archipelagic waters."I The United States needs to be especially
vigilant in this area, because a poorly drawn zone can subject states
which permit visits of nuclear weapons capable units to internal and
external pressures.2
6
2. Zones Should be Limited to Land Territory and Territorial
Sea. The recently concluded SEANWFZ treaty establishes a zone
which extends the full extent of the 200 NM exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) and continental shelf (CS) area of all of the parties and
enjoins both Treaty and Protocol Parties from using, testing, or
threatening use of nuclear weapons inside that area.17 Treaty parties
are further enjoined from stationing nuclear weapons or dumping any
radioactive waste within that zone.18  Of course, this inclusion of
EEZs and CS areas is problematic: once states accept the premise
that an EEZ and CS can be part of a new type of security apparatus,
this acceptance dilutes worldwide efforts by the United States and
other maritime states to ensure that the LOS Convention is
universally accepted and followed.
One can sympathize with smaller states who do not wish to be
gov/factsheelwmdlnuclear/unilatlsandy.htm>.
214. "Visits by nuclear powered ships-Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by
any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited." New
Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, supra note 187, at §11.
215. See Safety of Navigation: Designation of Certain Sea Lanes and Air Routes Thereabove
through Indonesian Achipelagic Waters (Note by Indonesia), I.M.O. Maritime Safety
Committee, 67th Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 2, U.N. Doc. MSC 6717/2 (1996). Paragraph 12
provides "For the purposes of... the safety of Indonesia... foreign vessels carrying nuclear
substances ... as well as foreign warships transiting through Indonesian waters from one part of
the... high seas ... to another party of the... high seas are recommended to use the sea
lanes .... " Id.
216. During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. military air transport made stops in Colombo, Sri
Lanka and Bombay, India. Critics framed these brief stops as violations of the Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace. See Sri Lanka's Decision to Permit U.S., Allied Aircraft to Refuel in Colombo
Criticized, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, Feb. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File (concerning criticisms of the Sri Lankan government by an opposition
party), and Patrick Cruez, Sri Lanka Turns Away U.S. Warships, One Berths in Bombay, AP,
Jan. 30, 1991, available in 1991 WL 6169218 (concerning criticism of the Indian government for
permitting a military transport aircraft to stop in Bombay to refuel).
217. See SEANWFZ, supra note 8, arts. 2-3.
218. See id.
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caught in a nuclear crossfire, as the effects of any type of nuclear
exchange are typically experienced over a very large region. Yet the
inclusion of CS and EEZs in the SEANWVFZ proposal is something
that should, unless amended, continue to be resisted by the United
States and the P-5 for three basic reasons.1 9 First, inclusion of the
EEZ and CS in the zone of application accomplishes little because
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and most potential
nuclear weapons states are parties to the long-standing Seabed Arms
Control treaty which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons
on the seabed seaward of the 12NM limit.' Second, the EEZ and CS
are fundamentally resource zones under the 1982 LOS Convention,
and thus, were never intended to be security zones.2' Acceptance of
the SEANWFZ formula would, in effect, ratify an excessive maritime
claim. Third, the inclusion of EEZs and CS areas potentially makes
it difficult for U.S. nuclear weapons capable vessels, such as carrier
battlegroups, to conduct fixed "on station" operations in these
foreign (EEZ or CS) areas. In such a case, the United States would
of course argue that naval presence in these areas is legally justified
as a high seas freedom. However, once again, there is no reason for
the United States to sign a treaty which gives its political opponents
the argument that the United States would not be "respecting"= the
SEANWFZ if it conducted carrier battlegroup operations in the vast
CS or EEZ.
D. Principle 4: The United States Should Continue to Hold the Line
Against Zonal "Domination" of the High Seas.
The ad hoe Zone of Peace Proposals for the Indian Ocean,
219. See Nirmal Ghosh, U.S. "Still Concerned About ASEAN Nuclear-Arms-Free Zone,"
STRA1Ts TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, South-East Asia section, at 29. An interview with U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Winston Lord disclosed that the United States and all of the nuclear powers
continued to have problems with the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. He
stated that Washington's "single major concern is the fact that exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves are included in the terms of coverage ... and it is of major concern to us."
Id.; see also State Department Regular Briefing, Fed. News Service, Dec. 15, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednew File; State Department Regular Briefing, Fed. News Service,
Dec. 8,1995, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednew File.
220. See Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
supra note 34.
221. See LOS Convention, supra note 36, arts. 56,77.
222. "Each State Party undertakes to respect the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone... and to not contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the
Treaty or its Protocol." SEANWFZ, Protocol, supra note 8, art. 1.
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Southern Atlantic, and Southern Hemisphere seek incorporation of
the high seas to prevent collateral damage to coastal states from a
nuclear exchange on the high seas. The Indian Ocean proposal in
particular indirectly addresses the problem of the two undeclared
nuclear weapons states: Pakistan and India. However well-
intentioned, these zone proposals do little more than establish huge
buffer areas comprised of ocean space. The exercise of sovereignty
over areas of the high seas is contrary to international law in that "no
State [or group of states] may validly purport to subject any part of
the high seas to its sovereignty."' The right of the United States to
operate ships and aircraft-which may or may not have nuclear
weapons aboard-is a protected high seas freedom under the UN
LOS Convention, and should not be allowed to be diluted. 4 In
addition, from the standpoint of international peace and security, the
ability of U.S. warships to exercise their rights on the high seas has
had a stabilizing and deterrent impact on states which were
considering aggressive conduct of one sort or another. Future
restrictions on the location or operations of U.S. warships in the
South China Sea, the Aegean, the littoral regions of the former
Yugoslavia or the Straits of Taiwan, in order to deter aggressive
conduct, is not supported in most national or international policy
circles. New restrictions on maritime freedom also may undercut
U.S. security guarantees to countries with whom the United States
has a mutual defense treaty.
E. Principle 5: The United States Should Delay Ratification of Zones
Treaties Until There Is a High Assurance of Participation by
Threshold States.
Following South Africa's unilateral dismantling of its nuclear
weapons program and its pivotal role in securing indefinite extension
of the NPT in May of 1995,2 there was a push by that Government
to secure U.S. support for the ANWFZ. 6 However, while there may
be a strong political imperative surrounding the ANWFZ Treaty, one
must question whether the nuclear non-proliferation goals are truly
being met in the face of reports that all eligible Arab states, including
the host Egypt, will not ratify the ANWFZ until Israel renounces it
223. LOS Convention, supra note 36, art. 89.
224. See id. art. 87.
225. See Tom Zamora Collina, South Africa Bridges the Gap, 51 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS
4 (1995).
226. See Fisher, supra note 88, at 13.
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nuclear weapons program.'
Since South Africa's now dismantled nuclear weapons program'
was the only significant nuclear proliferation threat on the African
continent, it is far from clear how U.S. ratification will promote
African nuclear non-proliferation if the Arab states do not ratify the
ANWFZ Treaty. This situation is exacerbated by the extensive
media reports that Libya-a signatory of the NPT-continues to
ignore its NPT commitments and aggressively seek nuclear weapons
technology. 9 While there will be pressure on the United States to
ratify the ANWFZ Treaty, that action should be carefully timed to
obtain maximum participation by the ANWFZ treaty parties if
nuclear non-proliferation is the true object of this endeavor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. signature of SPNFZ and ANWFZ treaties was a shot of
adrenaline to nuclear non-proliferation advocates inside and outside
the federal government. In the coming months, one can expect that
there will be pressure on the United States to accept SEANWFZ in
one for form or another, and to look seriously at the CEENWFZ in
the context of NATO enlargement.
The United States should work with ASEAN to try to reform
the two major flaws in the SEANWFZ. If a suitable fix is not found,
there is no compelling reason, other than symbolic value, for the
United States or ASEAN to insist on U.S. participation in the
SEANWFZ,--the United States has already made commitments to
the SEANWFZ signatories through the NPT and CTBT.2 U.S.
ratification of the SPNFZ Treaty is a "feel good" proposition because
U.S. diplomacy was successful in providing leadership for P-5 support
of a zero-yield CTBT and, in doing so, may have prompted France to
227. See id.; see also Libya Urges Arabs to Get Nuclear Arms, AFP, Jan. 27, 1996, available
in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File (Libya's official JANA news agency claimed that Arab
states "have the right to try by any means to get the same [nuclear] weapons [as Israel],"
following a report by a right wing Israeli legislator that Israel would never renounce its nuclear
weapons program).
228. See Eddie Koch, South Africa Book Claims White Right Has Nuclear Weapons, Mail
and Guardian (Johannesburg), Africa News Service, Oct. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, Curnws File.
229. See Worldwide Threats to National Security: Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, Federal News Service, Feb. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednew
File (reporting on the testimony of CIA Director John Deutch). "Despite Libya's
pronouncement of its peaceful intent-the underlying motivation.., continues to be acquiring
nuclear weapons." DOD PROLIFERATION REPORT, supra note 103, at 25.
230. See CTBT, supra note 4; NPT, supra note 1.
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sign the SPNFZ Treaty and discontinue nuclear testing."l These were
the tangible deliverables which most benefited the region.
One blemish in the SPNFZ experience is New Zealand's failure
to show reciprocal courtesy to the United States by seeking repeal of
New Zealand legislation banning the visits of U.S. Navy nuclear
powered and nuclear weapons capable warships. The U.S. Senate
should strongly consider withholding ratification of SPNFZ until New
Zealand decides to act with more civility towards the United States.
A CEENWFZ Treaty which is narrowly drawnnz and pursued in
a phased manner, could provide the United States with immediate
diplomatic and international security rewards. It would provide a
face saving way of assuaging Russian concerns with NATO
enlargement (and the prospect of NATO nuclear weapons along
their frontier), while preserving the basic integrity of the North
Atlantic Treaty's duty of reciprocal assistance.
The U.S. case-by-case approach to zones remains sound, but the
criteria for U.S. support need to be updated to reflect the true
proliferation risks and the politics of deterrence. U.S. conventional
forces are pushed to their limit due to the current plethora of
traditional and non-traditional security taskings and downsizing,
making it imperative that U.S. policy makers rethink existing
deterrence models and carefully consider the positive role, with
appropriate signaling, that U.S. nuclear weapons have in curtailing
WMD proliferation. As the remaining superpower with global peace
and security obligations, it is imperative that the United States not
warm to zone proposals until the texts and the regional timing are
right.
231. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; see also Thomas McNamara, Asst.
Secretary Of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Hearing of the House Int'l Rel. Comm. Asia &
Pacific Aff. Subcomm. Regarding Nuclear Issues in the South Pacific, State Department Briefing,
Fed. News Service, Nov. 15,1995, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednew File.
232. In the short term, it is probable that a Central and Eastern European Nuclear Free
Zone is achievable if it extends to promises by the P-5 not to station nuclear weapons in the
zone, use zonal territories as a "launch site" (following the East German model, see supra note
54) for nuclear weapons or nuclear armed missiles targeted against a Treaty or Protocol party
(particularly Russia) or test nuclear weapons inside the zone. A more expansive agreement
which includes legally binding negative security assurances not to "use of threaten to use"
nuclear weapons inside or respecting the zone between the P-5 would be controversial and
difficult to negotiate.
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